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Abstract
I employ nonparametric estimation techniques to explore different aspects of
the performance of US bank holding companies (BHCs).
In my first essay “Market Pricing of U.S. Bank Holding Companies’ Technical
Efficiency” I use quarterly data from 1986 to 2009 to examine whether changes in
technical efficiencies of U.S. BHCs are reflected in their stock returns. The relation-
ship between technical efficiency and stock returns is analyzed both in a financial and
accounting framework. Efficiencies are estimated using the unconditional hyperbolic
α–quantile estimator developed by Wheelock and Wilson (2008). This estimator is
a local estimator and exhibits more desirable statistical properties than traditional
estimators. For large bank holding companies, I find evidence of a weak link be-
tween technical efficiency and stock returns. I find no other persistent and robust
relationship, an indication that the market may not value technical efficiency.
In my second essay, “Restricting the Size of Banks May Have Costs,” co-
authored with Paul W. Wilson, returns to scale for BHCs are examined. The empirical
evidence on scale economies among large BHCs operating in the U.S. is mixed, with
some studies finding mild evidence of increasing returns to scale while most studies
find no evidence of either increasing or decreasing returns. Most of studies have
relied on estimation of fully parametric translog specifications of cost functions. We
show that data on BHCs trivially reject the translog specification, and employ fully-
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nonparametric methods to estimate and make inference about returns to scale among
U.S. BHCs. Our results suggest that both economically and statistically significant
increasing returns to scale prevail throughout the range of sizes of BHCs. We use our
estimates to provide rough estimates of the cost, in terms of foregone scale economies,
of restricting the sizes of BHCs.
My third essay “Evolution of the U.S. Bank Holding Companies’ Performance
over Time: Evidence from Nonparametric Efficiencies” examines changes in the per-
formance of U.S. BHCs between 1988 and 2010. The Malmquist index measures the
total factor productivity change over time and can be decomposed into efficiency
change and technology change. I use the nonparametric, unconditional, hyperbolic
α–quantile estimator developed by Wheelock and Wilson (2008) to estimate three
types of efficiencies: technical, cost, and revenue, that I then use to construct the
decompositions of the Malmquist index. Results suggest that over the years, the
largest banks experienced the largest gains, on average, in technical, cost and revenue
efficiency, with the exception of 2005 -2010 period, and the smallest BHCs seem to
have experienced gains in all efficiencies. Estimates of the technology change show
a downward shift of theα–quantile (i.e., a decrease in the output produced for some
given input used), an upward shift of the cost α–quantile (i.e., an increase in the
minimum cost of producing some given output), and downward shift of the revenue
α–quantile (i.e., a decrease in the amount of revenue generated from the output pro-
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Chapter 1




When describing the performance of production units, it is common to char-
acterize them as being (in)efficient, or (non)productive. Productivity refers to the
ratio of outputs to inputs, and varies across firms due to differences in technology,
production process or production environment. Technical efficiency is one aspect of
productivity and it refers to the comparison between observed and potential levels of
inputs and outputs, measured by the ratio of observed output from the given level
of input to maximum potential output, for the same input level. In other words,
technical efficiency refers to the ability to avoid waste by producing the maximum
output with the input available (alternatively, it may refer to the ability to avoid
waste by using as little input as possible for a given production). Efficiency is tech-
1
nical because it considers solely the production process without taking into account
the role of market prices.
The foundations of technical efficiency were set in the 1950’s by Koopmans
(1951), Debreu (1951), Farrell (1957), and Shephard (1970) who defined different
measures of technical efficiency, and by Farrell (1957) and Charnes et al. (1978)
who used linear programming techniques for estimation. Since then, the estimation
techniques have been refined: from the initial, simple approaches of efficiency point
estimates computed from a linear program, today statistical methods are available
for statistical inference of technical efficiency.1 The body of literature in this field has
grown considerably over the past thirty years, with applications to a large number
of industries particularly banking, mutual funds, aviation, nursing, hospitals, agricul-
ture, transportation, electricity, and country-level studies such as the U.S., Australia,
Canada, Belgium, Greece, Italy, China, Norway, Israel. Gattoufi et al. (2004) provide
a comprehensive survey of the literature that examines technical and allocative effi-
ciency. They cite approximately 2,000 studies published in no fewer than 490 distinct
refereed journals published worldwide between 1951 and 2001. More than thousand
studies have been published since.
Given academics’ wide interest in technical efficiency as a performance mea-
sure, it is interesting to investigate whether investors value it and to what extent (i.e.
does a relationship between technical efficiency and stock returns exist?). This paper
examines whether changes in the quarterly technical efficiency of U.S. bank holding
companies (BHCs) are reflected in their quarterly stock returns. BHCs are analyzed
rather than subsidiary banks, since managers presumably make decisions with the
goals of the entire institution in mind.
1See Cooper et al. (2004) and Simar and Wilson (2000) for a review of past and current inference
methods.
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The question of a causal relationship between technical efficiency and stock
returns is an empirical one and no theoretical prediction of the relationship between
the two variables exists. I expect, however, that a positive and significant association
exists based on the fact that future profits and operating efficiency are potentially
interconnected. Financial theory holds that a company chooses positive net present
value projects to maximize shareholders’ wealth. Technical efficiency is an indicator
of current operational performance. Higher efficiency translates either into higher
output produced with the same inputs, or the same output level with less inputs. If
relative prices of both inputs and outputs are unchanged, then producing more output
with the same inputs leads to an increase in profitability. Also, even if technical
efficiency does not imply profit efficiency, technically inefficient firms are necessarily
not profit-efficient. Assuming constant prices of inputs and outputs, if two similar
firms use the same amount of inputs, and one produces less output, it has to be
the case that it is not maximizing its profits, relative to the other one. Thus, an
improvement in current performance should result, ceteris paribus, in higher future
profits. If the market values future profitability, a change in technical efficiency should
be incorporated in stock returns.
Conversely, Modigliani and Miller (1958) recognize that when a production
process is characterized by uncertainty, the firm’s objective is value maximization,
rather than profit maximization, because the latter does not account for produc-
tion risk or the appropriate discount rate applied to the profit stream.2 Given the
profit volatility in the highly leveraged banking industry, in addition to profitability,
investors examine a multitude of sources of information in search of indicators of
BHCs’ performance.
2Under uncertainty, there corresponds to each decision of the firm not a unique profit outcome,
but a plurality of mutually exclusive outcomes which can at best be described by a subjective
probability distribution.
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This paper offers two innovations to the existing literature on banking ef-
ficiency. First, it estimates technical efficiency employing the new non-parametric
unconditional hyperbolic α-quantile estimator developed by Wheelock and Wilson
(2008). The α-quantile estimator exhibits superior statistical properties in compari-
son to the traditional nonparametric efficiency estimators, such as data envelopment
analysis or free disposal hull. In contrast to the traditional estimators, this is a lo-
cal estimator: the benchmark comparison is given only by firms similar to the one
analyzed, and not the by the entire sample. This is particularly significant when
analyzing the banking industry. The U.S. banking industry consists of different size
BHCs where small BHCs with only few million dollars in assets operate side by side
with extremely large ones that have trillions of dollars in assets. The local α-quantile
estimator ensures a relevant relative comparison base as it enforces comparison of
firms of the same size.
The second innovation of this research comes from the richness of the data set
used. In contrast to the majority of studies in the field that use cross-sectional data,
my data consist of a sample of bank holding companies covering a period of more
than twenty years (1986 – 2009). There are over 1,000 BHCs in almost all of the 91
quarters analyzed, with a maximum of 1,830 observations in one quarter. This number
of observations is considerably higher than the sample size used in the majority of the
existing studies that analyze, on average, a cross section of few hundred observations.
The nature of the banking data in relation to technical efficiency has to be
discussed before proceeding with the analysis. The only BHC data source available,
to my knowledge, is provided by the quarterly reports that BHCs have to submit, by
law, to the Fed. While this is a rich source of information, the empirical banking field
recognizes the quarterly reports exhibit some drawbacks when it comes to estimating
efficiency in a frontier estimation framework. One of them relates to the information
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available on the total loan deposit amount only, without the number of accounts. As
other authors recognize too, it is not possible to distinguish output quality and higher
output implies higher efficiency. Loans made represent a bank’s output, but writing
more loans does not necessarily imply a higher efficiency level. Likewise, the book
value of loans is assumed to be the same as their market value, leading to incorrect
conclusions since excessive loan growth will be reflected as high efficiency.3 Foos et
al. (2009) examine the intertemporal relationship between abnormal loan growth and
the riskiness of banks on a sample of 16,000 European banks between 1997-2007.
They find that loan growth leads to an increase in loan loss provisions during the
next three years, a decrease in relative interest income, and to lower capital ratios.
These findings suggest that loan growth drives the riskiness of banks.
Other feature of the banking data is that market prices are not accounted for.
Thus, estimated efficiencies are technical: they account for the technical aspect of the
production of using too many inputs or producing too few outputs. The technical
efficiency does not reflect the allocative aspect of efficiency of (mis)responding to
relative prices in choosing inputs or outputs, or the management aspect of engaging
in high–risk activities. Since the banking industry is a highly leveraged, accounting
for risk is extremely important for a true description of the banking firm. But a BHC
that is very efficient, by technical efficiency measures, may also be very risky, since
it operates at “too high” leverage levels. In an attempt to mitigate the effect of lack
of market prices, I follow Hughes et al. (2001) and include the BHC’s capital as an
input in the production function. Hughes et al. (2001) document that BHCs’ scale
economies are uncovered when equity capital, in addition to debt, is included in the
production model.
3In many banks, higher loan volume is the result of misaligned incentives: employees are rewarded
for the number of accounts they open, without regard for the quality of the loans given out.
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Finally, some may be concerned with the fact that accounting data are used
to estimate efficiencies, as accounting data are past–looking, while stock prices are
forward-looking. However, I do not consider the accounting data an issue. From a
theroretical perspective, the price of a firms share in the market equals the expected
discounted payoff that does not depend on past performance. Financial theory holds
that markets are efficient and securities are fairly priced, with three levels of market
efficiency defined, distinguished by the amount of information incorporated in security
prices.4 Under the semi-strong version of the efficient market hypothesis, accounting
information is incorporated in stock prices. Since news about a change in efficiency
of a firm is public information, it is captured in its return, and thus there should be
a relation between the two.
Empirically, a consistent robust finding in the research examining the link
between accounting information and stock performance is that investors do react
to earnings announcements regardless of the industry or the time frame analyzed.
Patell and Wolfson (1984) found that the market adjusts very quickly when a firm
publishes its latest earnings or announces a dividend change. A major adjustment
in price occurs within five to ten minutes of the announcement. On the other hand,
Bernard and Thomas (1989) documented that investors underreact to the earnings
announcement and become aware of its full significance only as further information
arrives: it takes about 60 days until the market fully incorporates the new information,
regardless of the news being good or bad.
4The three efficiency levels are: (i) the weak form of efficiency: prices reflect the information
contained in the record of past prices. If markets are efficient in the weak sense, then it is impossible
to make consistently superior profits by studying past returns; (ii) the semistrong form of efficiency:
prices reflect not just past prices, but all other published information, such as the information in the
financial press or official governmental statistics. If markets are efficient in this sense, then prices will
adjust immediately to public information such as the announcement of the last quarter’s earnings;
and, (iii) the strong form of efficiency: prices reflect all the information that can be acquired by
painstaking analysis of the company and the economy.
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Practically, players in the financial markets are expected to evaluate a firm’s
performance based on a multitude of sources and indicators. Given the U.S. free
market system and free information flow technical efficiency may be one of the sources
of information for investors. Bognini et al. (2002) document the performance of three
sets of indicators: accounting data, stock prices, and credit ratings in forecasting
financial distress for banks in East Asian countries (1996–1998). They find that even
if the stock market has responded quicker, it did not significantly outpace accounting
information contained in the balance sheet or assessments by the credit agencies.5
If the market has the ability to process effectively the information available and if
efficiency scores capture some information relevant to the market, then there should
be an association between technical efficiency and stock returns.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 1.2 presents the
literature review, Section 1.3 describes the estimation procedure, Section 1.4 describes
the data, Section 1.5 presents the results, and Section 1.6 concludes the paper.
1.2 Literature Review
Berger and Humphrey (1997) surveyed 130 studies of efficiency analysis of
financial institutions in 21 countries. They find, unsurprisingly, that various efficiency
models and estimators yield different results depending on the frontier used and on
how output is measured (flow or stock variable), with slightly higher estimates from
nonparametric studies. Once a model and an output specification are adopted, the
5On the other hand, the current financial crisis showed that there are times when the market does
not uncover a bubble while it’s developing. The official report on Lehman Brothers (2010) showed
that the company had used Repo 105 (purchase and resale) transactions to remove approximately
$50 billion of liquid assets from the balance sheet in 2008 in order to decrease its net leverage. This
information was not seized by the market. Secretary Geithner stated: “If this had been a bank we
were supervising, that [i.e., Lehmans Repo 105 program] would have been a huge issue for the New
York Fed.” Thus, revealed accounting statements, may reveal information not available otherwise.
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estimates are fairly stable.
While research on efficiency in the financial/ banking sector is very rich, there
are only a handful of papers that analyze the association between stock markets and
technical efficiency. Eisenbeis et al. (1999) analyze “the informativeness of stochastic
frontier and programming frontier” by examining a sample of 254 BHCs over the
time period 1986-1991. For their sample, they find that while both the stochastic and
the programming frontier measures result in a similar ranking of firms’ efficiencies,
estimates derived from the stochastic frontier are associated with risk-taking behavior,
managerial performance, and stock returns. Efficiency estimated nonparametrically
does not exhibit such a pattern (it shows little consistent association with any of the
above measures). The authors conclude that the programming efficiencies are not
economically meaningful, thus they are not informative, as apposed to the stochastic
ones.
Beccalli and Casu (2006) analyze a sample of European publicly traded banks
in the year 2000. They regress the annual stock returns on annual change in efficiency,
estimated by both stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and data envelopment analysis
(DEA), proxies for size, risk and profit, and country dummies. Their results suggest
that 1 percent change in the annual efficiency score derived from DEA leads to an
approximately 0.4 percent change in annual bank returns (or a 0.2 percent change,
if performance proxies and country dummies are included in the model). The SFA
estimates show a similar pattern, but less strong. The inclusion of accounting data to
proxy for riskiness or profitability does not seem to increase the explanatory power
of the model.
Results obtained by Kirkwood and Nahm (2006) similarly suggest that changes
in firms’ efficiencies are reflected in stock returns. They examine a sample of 67 Aus-
tralian banks over the 1995-2002 time period using the three-factor capital asset
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pricing model. The change in profit efficiency is positive and statistically significant
for the regional banks, but insignificant for the major banks. However, the authors
interpret the results as an indication of positive association between changes in effi-
ciency and returns. The beta value for the major banks was estimated to be 1.43, and
beta for the regional banks is 0.58, suggesting, against the general belief, that major
banks returns are more sensitive to overall market movements than the regional banks
returns.
Ioannidis et al. (2008) estimate the stochastic cost and profit efficiency of
a sample of Asian and Latin American publicly traded banks over the 2000–2006
period. They regress the annual bank returns on annual efficiencies changes, and find
a positive, robust relationship between the profit efficiency and the stock returns, but
no evidence of such a relationship for cost efficiency. The authors’ explanation for
this finding is that shareholders are more interested in their wealth, thus are more
interested in dividend payments and capital gains. Since dividends will be paid on
the basis of profits, stock returns are more sensitive to profit efficiency rather than
cost efficiency.
Another way to think about whether the market should value technical effi-
ciency is to examine whether this measure can predict future outcomes. Wheelock and
Wilson (1995) offer evidence in this sense. They analyze the failures of commercial
banks in Kansas in early twentieth century. Among the factors examined to explain
bank failure, they use a measure of technical efficiency estimated from a stochastic
frontier. Modelling time-to-failure in a proportional hazards framework, and find
that, among other determinants, technically inefficient banks were more likely to fail
than technically efficient banks.
Apart from the banking industry, Semenick Alam and Sickles (1998) examined
the connection between stock prices and technical efficiency using U.S. airline data for
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a sample of eleven companies for a twenty-year period. A quarterly efficiency score
calculated for each firm employing the data envelopment analysis (DEA), and the free
disposal hull (FDH) is compared with the return. They employ a simple correlation
test; to check for robustness, they construct portfolios of the top and bottom firms
and verify that the average return for the top portfolio is consistently larger. Their
results show that there is a statistically and economically significant relationship
between technical efficiency changes and market returns. The correlation is observed
in the two months after the financial data is disclosed.
1.3 Estimation Procedure
1.3.1 Nonparametric Technical Efficiency Estimation
The nonparametric approaches of analyzing efficiency, generally known as data
envelopment techniques, are “data oriented” techniques for estimating the perfor-
mance of an economic agent relative to its peer agents by analyzing the production
process of transforming the inputs available into outputs. Formally, data envelopment
techniques are “methodologies directed to frontiers rather than central tendencies”
(Cooper et al., 2004). As opposed to trying to fit a regression plane through the cen-
ter of the data, in DEA set-up, one “floats” a piecewise linear surface to rest on top of
the observations. Both stochastic and nonparametric techniques exist for estimation
of technical efficiency.
DEA methods have the main advantage of not having to specify a functional
relationship between variables a priori. This offers a great level of flexibility: few as-
sumptions are necessary and, in particular, no assumptions about the frontier shape
or the distribution of inputs and outputs on the production set are necessary. The
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most popular nonparametric estimators are the free disposal hull (FDH) and data
envelopment analysis, and are based on the idea of estimating the attainable set by
enveloping the data. Charnes et al. (1978) operationalized the concept of efficiency
in terms of linear programming, such that efficiency in the presence of multiple in-
put and output factors is defined as the ratio between the weighted sum of outputs
and the weighted sum of inputs, and each firm selects input and output weights to
maximize its efficiency score. A “deterministic frontier” based on the observed data
is estimated, and using linear programs, the efficiency scores are estimated. These
efficiency measures are relative to the other data observed. Thus, full efficiency is
attained by any firm if and only if none of its inputs or outputs can be improved
without worsening some of its other inputs or outputs; given the deterministic fron-
tier, there will be observations that lie on the frontier (i.e., they are the most efficient
in either input or output direction).
Efficiencies estimated by DEA or FDH use the full frontier as a benchmark,
and indicate the minimum achievable level of input (or the maximum achievable level
of output) over all production plans that are technically feasible. The frontier is
sometimes referred to in the literature as “the observed best practice frontier,” since
observations that lie on it are the economic agents the most efficient (they use the
least amount of inputs and obtain the highest amount of output). While DEA or FDH
estimators exhibit several advantages over the parametric estimators, a trade-off exist:
no functional relationship has to be specified for the nonparametric estimators, thus
no “risk” of misspecification is encountered, as opposed to the parametric estimators.
But the parametric estimators have a high convergence rate, namely n(−1/2). Kneip
et al. (1998) show that the convergence rate for the DEA estimator is n−1/(p+q) and
n−2/(p+q) for the FDH (where p refers to the number of inputs used, and q to the
number of outputs used). As the number of inputs and outputs used increases, the size
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of the sample has to increase almost exponentially for the DEA or FDH estimators to
convergence, hence the “curse of dimensionality” for the nonparametric estimators.
Another shortcoming of the traditional estimators is that they are consistent only
asymptotically. Though bootstrapping offers an alternative to estimation, the curse of
dimensionality is still present: the sample size has to be quite large for the estimators
to be consistent. Finally, the DEA and FDH estimators are extremely sensitive to
outliers.
1.3.2 Hyperbolic α-quantile Estimation
Wheelock and Wilson (2008) extended results obtained by Daouia and Simar
(2007) and developed the unconditional hyperbolic α-quantile estimator in order to
deal with the drawbacks of traditional nonparametric estimators. The α-quantile
estimator is robust to outliers in the data and has a high convergence rate (compa-
rable to the parametric estimators’ convergence rate). Besides the better statistical
properties, there are other features that make this estimator a more desirable one in
practice. First, the α-quantile estimator is a “partial” frontier estimator: the bench-
mark comparison is not the entire population of firms (as it is the case for traditional
estimators), but only the ones similar to the firm analyzed. The BHCs analyzed in
this paper differ greatly in size: although all firms operate in the same industry, their
operations are not comparable. The α-quantile estimator is a local estimator, in the
sense that it allows comparison of firms in the neighborhood of the analyzed firm.
Even more, the researcher can choose the desired size of the neighborhood (i.e. one
can choose to use 1 percent of the sample observations as benchmark or 10 percent).
The second desirable feature of the α-quantile is that it allows estimation of
the efficiency along a hyperbolic path, such that inputs and outputs are adjusted
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simultaneously, rather than just in the input or output direction, as it happens with
traditional estimators. In reality, when intending to change the scale of operations,
it is only rarely that one can act only in the input or in the output direction. The
traditional estimators estimate the distance from a fixed data point to the full frontier
in a direction orthogonal to the output axis (in the input orientation case), or to the
input axis (in the output orientation case). If the sector analyzed operates under
variable returns to scale, then the choice of input or output orientation has a big
impact on the measured efficiency: a large firm could lie close to the frontier in the
output direction, but far from it in the input direction, while a small firm could be
close to the frontier in the input direction, but far from in the output direction. By
allowing estimation of the efficiency along a hyperbolic path where inputs and outputs
are adjusted simultaneously, the α-quantile estimator overcomes this issue.
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 illustrate these concepts, where it is assumed that the
production process is characterized by a single- input and single- output (assump-
tion made only for simplification, so that the process can be illustrated in a two-
dimensional graph). Figure 1.1 shows the DEA approach for measuring efficiency.
The deterministic, piecewise-linear DEA frontier is shown, as determined by the data.
There are few observations: A, B, and C, representing individual firms, that lie inside
the production set, and not on the production frontier. A comparison between agents
A and B based on the input distance function reveals that A is significantly more
efficient than B: an efficiency estimate in the input direction would be found by esti-
mating the distance from the individual firms to the frontier in a direction orthogonal
to y. We can see that A lies much closer to the frontier in the input direction, than B
does. However, if efficiency in the output direction is estimated, then the opposite is
found: B is more efficient than A, since B lies closer to the frontier in the output di-
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rection.6 Analyzing the agents A and B, the natural implication is that they operate
at different production scales, and thus a comparison between the two of them would
not be extremely revealing. The α-quantile estimation method, illustrated in Figure
1.2, deals with this issue by estimating the distance to the frontier in the hyperbolic
direction, instead of the orthogonal one. If agent A is the observation of interest,
then its efficiency is given by the estimate distance to the frontier estimate in the
hyperbolic path. This is more meaningful in an economic sense because it is more
reasonable to assume that alteration of the inputs mix would result in an change on
the outputs side too, and vice versa. Also, this method allows the researcher to set
the size of the sample against which firms should be benchmarked. In the exampled
shown in figure 2, if A is to be compared to 30 percent of the sample in the neighbor-
hood of A, then the efficiency estimate is the estimation of the distance from A to the
frontier along the hyperbolic path. If A is to be compared to only 15 percent, then
the efficiency estimate is the estimation of the distance from the projection of A, the
point represented in the figure by A’, to the frontier along the hyperbolic path.
Formally, we can describe the model in the following manner. This presen-
tation is based on Wheelock and Wilson (2008). Consider the following production
possibilities set:
P ≡ {(x ,y) | x can produce y} ⊂ Rp+q+ , (1.1)
where x ∈ Rp+ and y ∈ R
q
+ denote vectors of inputs and outputs, respectively, and
P δ denotes the upper boundary of the production set P, referred to as the technology
frontier.
The goal is to estimate the distance from an observation, a point (x ,y) in the
space P, to the frontier P δ.
6There are agents, like the one at C, for which measuring efficiency in the input or output direction
does not seem to make a difference.
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The hyperbolic-graph distance function measures the distance from a fixed
point (x ,y) to P δ along the hyperbolic path: (γ−1x , γy), where γ ⊂ R1++. The
hyperbolic distance function is given by
γ(x ,y | P ) ≡ sup
{
γ > 0 | (γ−1x , γy) ∈ P
}
. (1.2)
In order to measure the efficiency along this hyperbolic path, we have to
first estimate the frontier. Note that P represents the true production set, out of
which we observe only a sample. The data sample observed comprises realizations
of iid random variables with probability density function f(x ,y) with support over
P. Let (x δ0,y
δ
0) ∈ P δ denote a point of the frontier P δ. The density f(x ,y) implies
a probability function that gives the likelihood of drawing an observation from the
f(x ,y) that weakly dominates the agent operating at (x δ0,y
δ
0) ∈ P δ. An observation
f(x̃ , ỹ) weakly dominates f(x ,y) if x̃ ≤ x and ỹ ≥ y . Formally, we express this
probability function in the following way:
H(x 0,y0) = Pr(x ≤ x 0,y ≥ y0). (1.3)
Using the probability function defined above, we can express the hyperbolic
distance function as
γ(x ,y | P) = sup
{
γ > 0 | H(γ−1x , γy) > 0
}
(1.4)
and the hyperbolic α-quantile distance function as
γα(x ,y) = sup
{




For 0 < α < 1 and a fixed point (x ,y) ∈ <p+q+ , γα(x ,y) > 1 gives the
proportionate, simultaneous decrease in inputs and increase in outputs required to
move from (x ,y) along a path (γ−1x , γy) , γ > 0, to a point with (1−α) probability




−1x , γα(x ,y)y) | (x ,y) ∈ P
}
. (1.6)
To estimate the hyperbolic α-quantile distance function and frontier, the prob-
ability function defined in (3.3) is replaced by its empirical analog. Using the bisection
method, the estimator of the distance function, γ̂α(x ,y), can be computed. Wheelock
and Wilson (2008) expose at length the estimation procedure.
1.3.3 Bank Efficiency and Stock Performance
To examine the causal relationship between the two measures of firm’s perfor-
mance, the technical efficiency and the stock returns, I estimate two empirical models.
One model makes use of the financial framework. I estimate the below model that is
routinely used in the literature to examine the influence of a “nontraditional” factor
on stock returns, where changes in the S&P 500 return and changes in the technical
efficiency estimates are related to changes in the BHCs’ returns. Considering a firm’s
valuation in the market depends on the overall macroeconomic conditions (changes in
interest rates, economic growth, industry performance) and on firm’s specifics (firm’s
ability to generate future cash flows, its capital structure, its ability to “innovate”
by undertaking projects that give a higher rate of return to the cost of capital), the
S&P 500 return is included to reflect the overall changes in the market conditions,
and the change in technical efficiency to reflect the overall changes at the firm level.
The model to be estimated is presented below, and time fixed effects, or/and quartile
16
dummies, or/and interaction terms between efficiency scores and quartiles.7
Rit = β0 + β1SP500t + β2∆γ̂α(x ,y)it + εit, (1.7)
where Rit designates the quarterly return of BHC i in quarter t , SP500t the S&P 500
return in quarter t , ∆γ̂α(x ,y)it is the estimated change in the α-quantile hyperbolic
estimate of technical efficiency for the BHC i in quarter t , and εit is a normally
distributed error term. Since the banking data is reported quarterly, in order to have
full correspondence between the two measures, quarterly returns were calculated.
The change in estimated efficiency was calculated as a percentage change between
the efficiency estimates of two consecutive quarters: ∆γ̂α(x ,y)it = [(γ̂α(x ,y)it −
γ̂α(x ,y)it−1)/γ̂α(x ,y)it−1].
The second model uses the accounting set-up. To date, extensive research
has failed to find strong links between accounting data and stock returns. Zhang
(2000) and Chen and Zhang (2006) provide a theoretical model and an empirical test
to explain cross-sectional variation in the stock returns by accounting data. Their
valuation model is based on the the fact that firm value consists of the value of
owned assets plus the value of the growth opportunities (thus maintaining that stock
returns are forward looking and reflect future profitability). Valuation amounts to
forecasting the scale and profitability of future operations. Returns are estimated
as a function of earnings yield, equity capital investment, changes in profitability, in
growth opportunities and in the discount rate. Their model explains about 20 percent
of returns variation in their sample that comprises firm-level data covering the period
1983-2001.
I build on the model developed by Zhang (2000) and Chen and Zhang (2006),
7I divided each quarterly data into four quartiles based on their assets size. The fourth quartile
contains the largest BHCs.
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with the following differences. First, I use the change in estimated efficiency score as
a proxy for change in profitability. Second, the authors employ the consensus analyst
forecasts of long-term earning growth from the I/B/E/S database as a proxy for the
growth opportunities. I employ the ratio of loan provisions to total loans to proxy
for the growth opportunities. This ratio indicates the reserves banks set aside to
cover potential future losses in the loan portfolio. The higher this ratio is, the more
loans are forecasted to be charged-off in the future. Hence, the higher this ratio is,
the lower is the future growth potential of the bank. I estimate the following model,
also employing time fixed effects, or/and quartile dummies, or/and interaction terms
between efficiency scores and quartiles:
Rit = α0 + α1∆γ̂α(x ,y)it + α2Earnit + α3Eqit + α4Growthit + α5rt + eit, (1.8)
where Rit and ∆γ̂α(x ,y)it are defined in the same way as in the financial model.
Earnit shows the quarterly change in earnings of BHC i in quarter t , Eqit is the
quarterly change in the book value of equity of BHC i in quarter t , Growthit is
loan provision to total loans ratio of BHC i in quarter t , and rt is the change in the
discount rate in quarter t relative to quarter t − 1 . As with the change in efficiency,
the changes in different variables were calculated as percentage changes between the
values of two consecutive quarters.
1.4 Data
The data on BHCs are collected from the Federal Reserve Bank’s (FBR) FR-Y
9C forms (FRB of Chicago website), which contain information on BHCs required
to report their accounting statements to the Fed. The sample comprises data on all
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BHCs that reported to the Fed, between 1986:Q4 - 2009:Q2. Starting March 2006, the
Fed increased the asset-size threshold for filing the FR Y-9C form from $150 million
to $500 million. The stock return data were collected from the Center in Research in
Security Prices (CRSP). Also, the CRSP-FRB link data set, made available by the
New York Fed, was used to merge the two data sets.8 The GDP deflator data was
collected from the St. Louis Fed website.
1.4.1 Input /Output Specification
The specification of inputs and outputs of bank production is part of an on-
going debate. I use the intermediation approach, according to which banking insti-
tutions buy and sell funds, thus they act as intermediaries between borrowers and
lenders. In this framework, deposits are considered inputs and loans and investments
outputs. I employ the intermediation approach motivated not solely by data availabil-
ity, but also following Sealey and Lindley (1977). Sealey and Lindley (1977) develop
a model of behavior of financial firms consistent with the neoclassical theory of the
firm. They attempt to classify inputs and outputs of the financial firm by considering
the technical aspect of production for the financial firm. Their production model is
defined, following Frisch (1965), as a“transformation” process, where “certain goods
and/or services (inputs) enter into a process in which they loose their identity, i.e.
cease to exist in the original form, while other goods and services (outputs) are gen-
erated.9
Table 1.1 shows the definitions of inputs and outputs chosen for the technical
8The CRSP-FRB data are avalaible at:
http : //www.newyorkfed.org/research/banking research/datasets.html.
9Three approaches to modeling production functions exist in the literature: (i) the intermediation
approach, (ii) the intermediation approach, according to which funds are collected from depositors
and banks compete to attract depositors (deposits are considered outputs in this set-up), and (iii)
the user cost approach, that defines inputs and outputs based on their contribution to revenue.
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score specification that I use as the main specification in this paper. As inputs, I
use labor, physical capital, core deposits, purchased funds, equity, charged-off loans
(used as the ratio of 1 to charged-off loans, to reflect the “non desirable” nature of
the charged-off loans) and recovered charged-off loans. I include equity as an input
since equity may be used as an alternative to deposits in funding loans. This may
account, to a certain extend, for the management of risk. Furthermore, Mester (1996)
argues that the inclusion of equity in the analysis may account for differences in bank
managers risk attitude, since higher levels of equity reduce the risk of default. Berger
and Mester (1997) argue that equity should be included, given the greater dependence
of large banks on debt financing than smaller banks.
I include the charged-off and recovered loans in an attempt to account for
unmeasured differences in output quality.10 Berger and Mester (1997) try to mitigate
the same problem by including the ratio of charged-off loans to total loans in the state.
Concerned that nonperforming loans may be endogenous to the production function,
they chose to use the ratio of nonperforming loans rather than just the level of non-
performing loans. In theory, nonperforming loans are exogenous if they are caused
by negative economic shocks. Berger and Mester (1997) argue, however, that if we
consider the production model, all output variables are ultimately endogenous since
they are chosen by the bank. Considering this argument, and the fact that banks do
not choose per se the level of nonperforming loans, I consider that the nonperforming
loans are exogenous to the production function and, thus, it is appropriate to include
this variable as an input in the production specification.
As outputs, I use securities, real estate loans, consumer loans, business loans,
10The reason why I include two variables, rather than just one: charged-off loans net of recoveries,
is that there are BHCs that do not have any charged-off loans in some quarters, but they do have
recovered loans. Thus, if I included only one variable, the resulting input would have some negative
values.
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other loans (calculated as the difference between total loans and the summation of
the loan categories) and off-balance items. The reason for defining different loan
categories as different outputs, rather than just one output, total loans, is to allow for
some heterogeneity among firms. Off-balance activities are included since, recently,
banks have increasingly engaged in more non-traditional banking activities.
Table 1.2 shows other specifications used to estimate the efficiency scores, as
robustness checks: the “basic” specification does not consider the charged-off loans
and recovered loans as inputs, or the off-balance activities as output. It only includes
inputs and outputs describing the traditional banking activities, thus “basic” spec-
ification. The other specification, referred to as the “inclusive” specification, differs
from the “basic” one by considering the off-balance activities as an output.
I estimated efficiency scores using the three different specifications, and differ-
ent sample size for the comparison groups: 1 percent of the sample (corresponding to
a value of α of 0.99), 5 percent (α=0.95), and 10 percent (α=0.90). Table 1.3 presents
the Pearson correlation coefficients between these different efficiency measures for the
entire sample and selected quarters. The correlation coefficient between the “pre-
ferred” specification and the “inclusive” one is around 0.80 for similar benchmark
groups, for the entire sample of just quarterly data; similarly, the correlation between
the “preferred” specification and the “basic” one is approximately 0.75, and between
the “inclusive” and the “basic” one of approximately 0.90. Thus, we can conclude
they are relatively similar (with the “inclusive” and the “basic” specification being
very similar). The reason that the favorite specification was the “preferred” is based
on the attempt to allow for firm heterogeneity and account for risk to a certain extent,
and thus it is desirable to account for nonperforming loans.
Table 1.4 presents the summary statistics for the efficiency scores. The FEAR
package by Wilson (2008) was used to obtain the efficiency estimates. Given the
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difference in the firms, detailed statistics are presented for each bank quartile: banks
were divided into four quartiles based on asset size in each quarter. Comparison of
the efficiency score across years is not informative since it is a relative measure: it
relates the new performance of the BHC to performance of BHCs in the benchmark,
that may have experienced changes themselves. Within the same quarter, however,
firms in the second quartile are the most inefficient (the high score translates into
low efficiency), in almost each of the quarters analyzed. It does not appear that
there is a consistent significant difference between the average efficiency of a small
BHC versus a large one. On the other hand, given small BHCs operate at different
scale than the large BHCs, the comparison may not have economic significance. In
the first quarter of 2007, the average estimated efficiency for large banks was 0.4638.
That is, on average they were using about 46.38 percent of the input amount and
produced more than double (1/0.4638) the output of a BHC located on the frontier
of the comparison group. Also, it seems that in each quartile, smaller banks are more
efficient than their larger counterparts.
Table 1.5 presents the summary statistics for input and output variables for the
overall sample and for selective quarters (all values in constant 2005 $). The striking
feature of the data is the significant difference in BHC size: in the first quarter of
1997, while the the average value for total assets was $4, 432, 190, 000, the average
value for total assets for the smallest quartile (by asset size) was only $229, 804, 000.
There is a similar difference between the BHCs in other respects too: total loans,
liabilities, deposits,... It is important to emphasize that a partial frontier efficiency
score is even more desirable in this context: given the wide distribution of BHCs, it
is obvious that full frontier estimates would not be meaningful. The average size of
a bank increased over time, and also the difference between large and small banks
increased too. The fact that the number of BHCs increased overtime (by almost 20
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percent between 1987 and 1997) is not surprising. The BHC legal status offers some
advantages over the “bank” only status, i.e. it is easier to borrow from the Fed.
Also, in 1994 the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act that
allowed banks to operate in different states was passed. In 1999, the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act was passed, allowing BHCs to engage in non-traditional banking activities
(i.e.: financial activities, insurance underwriting). This act was an incentive for more
banks to adopt the BHC status. However, the lower number of banks in 2007 reflects
the change in the reporting rules imposed by the Fed in 2006.
1.5 Empirical Results
A priori, if the financial markets are efficient and if the nonparametric efficiency
measure captures inefficiencies relevant to the market, we would expect a relationship
between the α-quantile estimator and the stock returns. Aware of the fact that, by
its nature, the banking business implies a high level of risk11, and that the efficiency
measure may capture some risk by including equity as an input, Table 1.6 presents the
Pearson correlation coefficients between the α-quantile estimator and the accounting
measure of risk: the ratio of equity to total assets. This measure reflects the capital
adequacy or financial leverage of the company. According to Eisenbeis et al. (1999),
this ratio also captures the degree to which shareholders have their own capital at risk
in the institution, and thus may reflect their incentives to monitor management and
assure that the institution operates efficiently. The degree of correlation between this
ratio and the efficiency is quite low. Examining the entire sample, the correlation is
positive for the first three quarters, implying that a more risky bank is more inefficient
too (by construction, a lower value of the α-quantile estimator is indicative of higher
11Agents in the stock market attempt not only to account for risk, but they analyze the different
types of banking risks: solvency, liquidity, credit, interest rate, and operating risk, separately.
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efficiency). For the largest banks, the coefficient shows an opposite correlation: the
largest banks are more risky and more efficient. However, the correlation relationship
does not appear to be stable: each quartile exhibits negative or positive correlation
in different quarters. Although correlation does not imply causation, and the equity
to assets ratio is only a broad measure of risk, we can conclude that the efficiency
measure does not appear to be reflective of risk.
Table 1.7 shows the results from the financial model shown in (3.7), where
the quarterly stock returns are regressed against the quarterly change in efficiency,
the S&P 500 return, with or without quartile dummies, time fixed effects, or in-
teraction terms. The efficiency scores were estimated using all the available data
(110,642 observations), but the regression analysis includes only BHCs that are pub-
licly traded, hence the sample reduces to 27,328 observations. A negative coefficient
for the efficiency change variable would be indicative of a negative association between
inefficiency and returns. Column (1) of Table 1.7 is an attempt to show whether a
“raw” relationship between the variables of interest exists: the change in efficiency
coefficient, though it has the expected sign, has very low magnitude and is not signifi-
cant. Specifications shown in columns (2) – (4), where the S&P500 return, year fixed
effects, and quartile dummies where included, indicate that the change in efficiency
does not have a causal implication for the stock return.
If the size of the BHC has an impact on the operations of the company (given
the non-normality of the inputs/output data), then interaction terms between ef-
ficiency and quartile should be included. The results from these specifications are
shown in column (5) and (6), the latter including time effects too. Except for the
large banks, results do not show an association between the α-quantile estimators and
the stock returns: as in the previous regressions, the coefficient of interest has a very
low value, is insignificant, and does not exhibit the same sign in different regressions.
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The returns of large banks seem to reflect the change in efficiency: if a BHC in the
fourth quartile improves its efficiency by 1 percent, then its quarter stock return will
increase by 0.013 percent, or by 0.008 percent if year effects are added to the regres-
sion. The significance level and the sign of the coefficients could be interpreted in
this case as weak evidence of a causal relationship: maybe the large banks are riskier
and their operations have a higher degree of complexity, such that the market agents
analyze them more carefully. If we take into account, however, the magnitude of the
coefficient, and if we corroborate the findings that the market does reflect changes
in efficiency for the banks of other size, it is difficult to claim the weak evidence
wholeheartedly. Another surprising finding is that the size of the bank does not seem
to have an impact on the holding period return. As expected, consistent with the
theory and prior research in the financial field, the coefficient on the S&P500 return
is positive and strongly significant in all regressions.
The results in Table 1.7 employ the “preferred” specification for the efficiency
score, estimated against a benchmark of 1 percent of the sample. As a robustness
check, the same model was analyzed with different input/output specifications for
the efficiency score or different benchmark sample sizes. Results are shown in Table
1.9. The first panel employs an efficiency estimator without the charged-off loans and
recovered charged-off loans as inputs, and the benchmark sample size of 1 percent.
In the second panel, charged-off loans and recovered charged-off loans were excluded
from the inputs category, and the off-balance items from the outputs for the efficiency
score calculation, with a base comparison group of 1 percent of the sample. The
results differ in some respects from the main specification. It appears that there is
a negative association between improvement in efficiency and stock returns for the
smallest BHCs (belonging to the first quartile). The weak link between efficiency
change and market returns for the large BHCs is not confirmed: significance level
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differs, and the estimated effect varies by estimation (it has both positive and negative
values).
In the third and fourth panel of Table 1.7, the “preferred” specification is
employed, but the comparison group is increased to 5 percent and 10 percent, respec-
tively, of the sample. The causality between change in technical efficiency and stock
returns for large BHCs is confirmed by these estimations. Thus, if the “preferred”
specification is used, regardless of the sample size employed as a benchmark, then it
seems there is an association between the change in efficiency and stock returns. This
suggests that accounting for charged-off loans is important.
The results from the accounting model from (1.7) are presented in Table 1.8.
Similar with the financial model outcome, the efficiency coefficients are significant
for the large banks, and also for the BHCs in the second quartile, but have a low
magnitude: 1 percent increase in efficiency causes a 0.015 percent change in the
quarter returns of the large banks, or 0.029 percent for the second quartile banks. The
ratio of loan provisions to total loans exhibit a strong and robust causal relationship
with the stock return. The market does not appear to react to a change in the ten-year
discount rate and the change in the quarterly earnings.
Thus, it could be concluded that the above analysis shows weak evidence of a
positive causal relationship between stock returns and change efficiency estimated by
the nonparametric α-quantile estimator. The results are in line with those obtained
by Eisenbeis et al. (1999), even if they used a much smaller sample and a different
method for estimating the technical efficiency.
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1.6 Conclusion
During recent decades, the research on firms technical efficiency has grown at a
significant pace. In this paper, I combine the capital market research and the efficiency
literature, by examining the relationship between this measure of performance and
the stock returns, the market performance measure, for a sample of BHCs that ranges
between 1986 and 2009. The unconditional hyperbolic α-quantile estimator was used
to estimate the efficiency score. This estimator, developed by Wheelock and Wilson
(2008), has superior statistical properties relative to other existing estimators: it is
robust to outliers in the data, has a high convergence rate, and allows for simultaneous
inputs and outputs adjustment.
The data provide weak evidence of a causal relationship between technical
efficiency and stock returns for the large banks. But no other consistent, robust
relationship is found, regardless of the econometric specification used, in the financial
or the accounting set-up, or of the efficiency score specification. I interpret this as
indication that investors do not value technical efficiency. Possible explanations for
this finding may be that the efficiency scores do not incorporate risk (a defining feature
of both stock returns and banking activity). Also, they do not account for output
quality, such that more loans (outputs) are associated, ceteris paribus, with higher
efficiency. Although I included equity, charged-off loans and recovered-charged-off
loans in the efficiency score specification in an attempt to control for these factors,
the outcomes were unchanged.
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Table 1.1: Inputs and Outputs Definitions
Inputs
Labor number of full-time equivalent employees
Physical capital premises and fixed assets (including capitalized leases)
Equity total bank holding company equity capital plus noncontrolling (mi-
nority) interests in consolidated subsidiaries
Core deposits domestic transactions accounts, time deposits under $100,000, and
savings deposits
Purchased funds time deposits over $100,000, Federal funds purchased in domestic
offices, securities sold under agreements to repurchase, trading lia-
bilities, other borrowed money, subordinated notes and debentures,
subordinated notes payable to unconsolidated trusts issuing trust pre-






Securities held-to-maturity securities, available-for-sale securities, federal funds
sold in domestic offices, securities purchased under agreements to
resell
Real estate loans loans secured by real estate
Consumer loans loans to individuals for household, family, and other personal expen-
ditures
Business loans commercial and industrial loans
Other loans
Off-balance items commercial and similar letters of credit, securities lent, financial
standby letters of credit conveyed to others, performance standby
letters of credit and foreign office guarantees, unused commitments
(revolving, open-end loans secured by 1−4 family residential proper-
ties, credit card lines, commitments to fund commercial real estate,
construction, and land development loans secured by real estate), all
other off-balance sheet items
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Table 1.2: Inputs and Outputs for Different Efficiency Specifications
Preferred specification Inclusive specification Basic specification
Inputs Labor Labor Labor
Physical capital Physical capital Physical capital
Equity Equity Equity
Core deposits Core deposits Core deposits
Purchased funds Purchased funds Purchased funds
Charged-off loans
Recovered charged-off loans
Outputs Securities Securities Securities
Real estate loans Real estate loans Real estate loans
Consumer loans Consumer loans Consumer loans
Business loans Business loans Business loans
Other loans Other loans Other loans
Off-balance items Off-balance items
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Table 1.3: Pearson Rank Correlation Coefficients of Different Specifications for the
Technical Efficiency Scores
pref. pref. pref. incl. incl. incl. basic basic
α=.99 α=.95 α=.90 α=.99 α=.95 α=.90 α=.99 α=.95
Entire Sample (n=110,663)
pref., α=.99 1
pref., α=.95 0.9353 1
pref., α=.90 0.8739 0.982 1
incl., α=.99 0.8355 0.7952 0.7456 1
incl., α=.95 0.7847 0.8527 0.8458 0.9292 1
incl., α=.90 0.7296 0.8381 0.8601 0.8645 0.9814 1
basic, α=.99 0.7918 0.7694 0.7265 0.9405 0.8962 0.8408 1
basic, α=.95 0.7444 0.8211 0.8186 0.8799 0.9615 0.9498 0.9327 1
basic, α=.90 0.6953 0.8086 0.8322 0.8229 0.9475 0.9681 0.8742 0.9832
1987 Q1 (n=980)
pref., α=.99 1
pref., α=.95 0.9152 1
pref., α=.90 0.7955 0.9606 1
incl., α=.99 0.8278 0.7694 0.6811 1
incl., α=.95 0.7509 0.8364 0.8324 0.9101 1
incl., α=.90 0.6359 0.7995 0.8616 0.7892 0.9625 1
basic, α=.99 0.7357 0.7013 0.6344 0.8865 0.8278 0.7316 1
basic, α=.95 0.6696 0.7734 0.7877 0.8117 0.9212 0.9057 0.903 1
basic, α=.90 0.5748 0.7486 0.8192 0.7093 0.895 0.9428 0.7931 0.967
1997 Q1 (n=1,170)
pref., α=.99 1
pref., α=.95 0.9241 1
pref., α=.90 0.8552 0.9814 1
incl., α=.99 0.8374 0.8088 0.7615 1
incl., α=.95 0.7734 0.8667 0.8661 0.927 1
incl., α=.90 0.7144 0.8525 0.8800 0.8629 0.9829 1
basic, α=.99 0.7860 0.7770 0.7391 0.9353 0.8900 0.8374 1
basic, α=.95 0.7277 0.8310 0.8376 0.8754 0.9614 0.9537 0.9296 1
basic, α=.90 0.6776 0.8213 0.8520 0.8200 0.9496 0.9706 0.8714 0.9850
2007 Q1 (n=819)
pref., α=.99 1
pref., α=.95 0.9455 1
pref., α=.90 0.9073 0.9882 1
incl., α=.99 0.8154 0.7854 0.7484 1
incl., α=.95 0.7834 0.8349 0.8224 0.9387 1
incl., α=.90 0.7506 0.8247 0.8270 0.8963 0.9873 1
basic, α=.99 0.7912 0.775 0.7418 0.9615 0.9252 0.8883 1
basic, α=.95 0.7621 0.8180 0.8085 0.9080 0.9766 0.9686 0.9447 1
basic, α=.90 0.7319 0.8080 0.8121 0.8695 0.9660 0.9791 0.9063 0.9887
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Table 1.4: Summary Statistics Efficiency Scores
Quartile1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Entire Sample (n=110,663)
Mean 0.4763 0.4983 0.4653 0.3863
St. Dev. 0.1160 0.1060 0.1068 0.1244
Q1 0.4014 0.4335 0.4765 0.3132
Median 0.4871 0.5068 0.5414 0.4021
Q3 0.5596 0.5742 0.5935 0.4765
1987 Q1 (n=980)
Mean 0.4074 0.4869 0.4537 0.4296
St. Dev. 0.1073 0.0888 0.1126 0.1146
Q1 0.3333 0.4293 0.3879 0.3654
Median 0.4029 0.4887 0.4735 0.4471
Q3 0.4781 0.5500 0.5331 0.5113
1997 Q1 (n=1,170)
Mean 0.5084 0.5076 0.4780 0.3963
St. Dev. 0.1196 0.0893 0.1038 0.1126
Q1 0.4286 0.4519 0.4248 0.3333
Median 0.5245 0.5095 0.4888 0.4122
Q3 0.5906 0.5731 0.5488 0.4818
2007 Q1 (n=819)
Mean 0.4847 0.5015 0.4638 0.4638
St. Dev. 0.1245 0.1157 0.1110 0.1110
Q1 0.4137 0.4416 0.3955 0.2963
Median 0.4933 0.5195 0.4749 0.3865
Q3 0.5792 0.5822 0.5411 0.4554
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Table 1.5: Summary statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3
Entire Sample (n=110,663)
Total assets 6,100,083 51,900,000 242,078 433,550 1,129,811
Total costs 104,833 799,108 4,116 7,297 18,624
Profits 23,084 269,337 765 1,512 3,904
Total loans 3,608,477 25,500,000 157,398 288,911 767,426
Total liabilities 5,827,420 47,900,000 236,272 418,234 1,070,686
Noninterest income 37,487 363,674 493 1,045 3,186
Inputs
Labor 1,881 11,645 116 196 452
Physical capital 76,390 431,716 4,613 8,822 21,668
Equity 596,200 4,517,289 27,316 46,845 118,658
Core deposits 2,744,793 16,500,000 190,410 325,417 785,939
Purchased funds 2,078,081 22,200,000 36,233 77,435 248,070
Charged-off loans 10,550 114,828 66 217 905
Recovered charged-off loans 1,839 17,168 17 52 195
Outputs
Securities 1,392,112 12,300,000 66,807 120,677 299,324
Real estate loans 1,709,302 12,000,000 92,728 183,955 495,855
Consumer loans 644,172 5,842,661 12,466 26,667 76,493
Business loans 881,427 6,101,187 22,321 47,868 130,993
Other loans 383,835 3,010,831 3,232 11,129 40,809
Off-balance items 1,103,365 15,400,000 2,582 10,069 38,014
1987 Q1 (n=980)
Total assets 3,795,049 15,800,000 221,296 410,894 1,403,011
Total costs 78,466 379,143 4,472 8,176 28,001
Profits 9,030 37,401 369 1,091 3,683
Total loans 2,393,417 10,300,00 112,926 230,664 848,387
Total liabilities 3,568,604 15,000,000 206,275 376,947 1,285,257
Noninterest income 14,912 83,195 382 917 3,629
Inputs
Labor 2,212 8,445 143 282 980
Physical capital 61,312 242,712 3,658 8,535 26,448
Equity 356,229 1,286,615 20,727 49,227 165,226
Core deposits 1,875,426 5,556,574 163,229 317,685 1,043,141
Purchased funds 926,761 4,192,237 23,648 59,891 243,918
Charged-off loans 5,805 36,411 85 305 1,160
Recovered charged-off loans 1,208 8,215 27 85 330
Outputs
Securities 664,681 2,051,295 58,785 123,775 365,965
Real estate loans 712,615 3,102,376 43,770 99,657 315,671
Consumer loans 444,544 2,128,172 18,807 44,900 181,751
Business loans 845,569 3,785,074 26,340 63,796 233,453
Other loans 416,791 2,145,176 6,245 18,777 79,332
Off-balance items 189,484 2,344,651 161 753 4,256
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Table 1.5 – continued
Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3
1997 Q1 (n=1,170)
Total assets 4,432,190 21,600,000 229,804 376,840 1,073,498
Total costs 90,266 449,070 4,460 7,389 20,270
Profits 26,408 126,920 1,140 1,976 5,604
Total loans 3,183,299 14,900,000 165,806 274,968 782,309
Total liabilities 4,858,634 23,900,000 247,783 407,373 1,168,022
Noninterest income 28,551 159,345 502 1,029 3,229
Inputs
Labor 1,823 7,947 129 214 529
Physical capital 80,447 380,173 4,985 8,969 23,360
Equity 547,289 2,545,608 29,810 49,761 152,147
Core deposits 2,695,989 10,600,000 203,383 331,915 916,502
Purchased funds 1,461,441 9,489,714 34,511 64,516 228,719
Charged-off loans 6,442 37,156 57 168 734
Recovered charged-off loans 1,731 10,294 21 58 252
Outputs
Securities 1,125,085 5,477,960 82,310 139,664 358,544
Real estate loans 1,366,521 5,730,347 100,762 172,701 478,783
Consumer loans 624,501 3,294,704 17,407 37,415 113,188
Business loans 860,930 4,662,541 23,543 47,747 139,589
Other loans 337,574 1,917,014 3,157 10,508 40,626
Off-balance items 810,107 5,419,348 4,341 12,275 38,249
2007 Q1 (n=819)
Total assets 13,700,000 109,000,000 612,550 938,739 2,123,228
Total costs 203,459 1,634,139 9,006 13,957 29,803
Profits 55,278 463,326 1,683 3,011 7,506
Total loans 6,765,415 45,300,000 410,898 659,278 1,428,176
Total liabilities 12,000,000 96,300,000 532,036 803,658 1,839,683
Noninterest income 80,540 753,449 1,181 2,191 5,548
Inputs
Labor 2,308 16,912 173 258 534
Physical capital 109,704 595,826 10,360 18,760 35,225
Equity 1,019,335 7,446,113 46,812 72,895 163,980
Core deposits 4,578,369 27,900,000 378,471 563,919 1,175,876
Purchased funds 5,682,955 52,200,000 141,655 240,250 563,203
Charged-off loans 13,294 136,245 63 203 721
Recovered charged-off loans 2,808 26,111 21 72 238
Outputs
Securities 2,994,788 26,700,000 98,690 181,032 405,115
Real estate loans 3,873,845 23,700,000 305,075 499,047 1,067,459
Consumer loans 1,047,298 9,727,503 10,173 24,996 66,496
Business loans 1,303,287 8,798,100 49,073 93,405 215,434
Other loans 546,462 4,642,534 4,403 15,994 61,426
Off-balance items 2,955,181 32,300,000 22,866 46,898 125,203
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Table 1.6: Pearson Rank Correlation Coefficients between Efficiency and Risk
Entire Sample 1987:Q1 1997:Q1 2007:Q1
(n=110,642) (n=979) (n=1,170) (n=819)
Quartile 1 0.0902 0.1628 0.0822 -0.0668
Quartile 2 0.0295 0.0820 -0.0007 0.1092
Quartile 3 0.0208 0.0145 0.0199 -0.1096
Quartile 4 -0.0871 0.2453 0.0665 0.1878
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Table 1.7: Efficiency and Stock Returns: Financial Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆γ̂α(x ,y) -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0001 -0.0008 -0.008 -0.012
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.020) (0.019)
∆γ̂α(x ,y)*2nd quartile -0.009 -0.010
(0.012) (0.011)
∆γ̂α(x ,y)*3rd quartile 0.0002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
∆γ̂α(x ,y)*4th quartile -0.013** -0.008*
(0.005) (0.005)
S&P return 0.554*** 0.551*** 0.554*** 0.554*** 0.551***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014)
2nd quartile 0.003 0.003 -0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
3rd quartile 0.009* 0.009 -0.001
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
4th quartile 0.009 0.009 0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
constant 0.035*** 0.024*** -0.071*** 0.058*** 0.016*** -0.072***
(0.011) (0.001) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005) (0.013)
n=27,328
NOTES:
1. Specification (3) includes time fixed effects, Specification (4) includes quartile dummies, Specifi-
cation (5) includes quartile dummies and interaction terms, and Specification (6) includes quartile
dummies, interaction terms, and time fixed effects.
2. Results of panel ordinary least squares regression of the effects of a change in the contemporane-
ous change in efficiency on stock returns.
3. Standard errors in parentheses; *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at
10% level, respectively.
4. Coefficients for the interaction terms show the point estimate of the effect of a change in efficiency
of a BHC belonging to a specific quartile on stock return.
5. ∆γ̂α(x ,y) is the quarterly change in technical efficiency.
6. The quartile variables are dummy variables that control for size: in each quarter, BHCs were
divided in four size quartiles, where the first quartile contains the smallest banks, and the fourth
one the largest BHCs. The benchmark is the first quartile. Time fixed are year fixed effects.
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Table 1.8: Efficiency and Stock Returns: Accounting Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆γ̂α(x ,y) -0.001 -0.0006 -0.001 -0.027 -0.023
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.021) (0.020)
∆γ̂α(x ,y)*2nd quartile -0.029** -0.028**
(0.012) (0.011)
∆γ̂α(x ,y)*3rd quartile 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
∆γ̂α(x ,y)*4th quartile -0.022*** -0.015***
(0.005) (0.004)
change in earnings 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
change in equity 0.011** 0.007 0.011** 0.011** 0.007
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
loan prov./total loans -9.192*** -7.190*** -9.202*** -9.318*** -7.280***
(0.365) (0.348) (0.365) (0.366) (0.348)
change in discount rate 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
2nd quartile 0.003 0.003 -0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
3rd quartile 0.013* 0.012* -0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
4th quartile 0.010 0.010 0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
constant 0.048*** -0.001 0.039*** 0.040*** -0.001
(0.002) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
n=27,328
NOTES:
1. Specification (2) includes time fixed effects, Specification (3) includes quartile dummies, Specifi-
cation (4) includes quartile dummies and interaction terms, and Specification (5) includes quartile
dummies, interaction terms, and time fixed effects.
2. Standard errors in parentheses; *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at
10% level, respectively. Coefficients for the interaction terms show the point estimate of the effect
of a change in efficiency of a BHC belonging to a specific quartile on stock return. The benchmark
is the first quartile (the smallest BHCs).
3. ∆γ̂α(x ,y) is the quarterly change in technical efficiency.
4. Time fixed are year fixed effects.
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Table 1.9: Efficiency and Stock Returns: Financial Model, Alter-
native Efficiency Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inclusive efficiency specification, α=.99
∆γ̂α(x ,y) 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0005 -0.0001 0.116** 0.104**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.051) (0.048)
∆γ̂α(x ,y)*2nd quartile 0.012 0.007
(0.030) (0.029)
∆γ̂α(x ,y)*3rd quartile 0.0002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
∆γ̂α(x ,y)*4th quartile -0.019** -0.008
(0.009) (0.008)
S&P return 0.554*** 0.551*** 0.554*** 0.554*** 0.551***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014)
2nd quartile 0.003 0.004 -0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
3rd quartile 0.009* 0.010* -0.0002
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
4th quartile 0.009 0.009* 0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
constant 0.035*** 0.024*** -0.071*** 0.058*** 0.016*** -0.072***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005) (0.013)
n=27,328
Basic efficiency specification, α=.99
∆γ̂α(x ,y) 0.0008 0.0002 0.0006 0.0002 0.131** 0.116**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.055) (0.052)
∆γ̂α(x ,y)*2nd quartile 0.015 0.007
(0.036) (0.034)
∆γ̂α(x ,y)*3rd quartile 0.0001 0.0005
(0.001) (0.0001)
∆γ̂α(x ,y)*4th quartile 0.005 0.026*
(0.015) (0.014)
S&P return 0.554*** 0.511*** 0.554*** 0.554*** 0.551***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014)
2nd quartile 0.003 0.004 -0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
3rd quartile 0.009* 0.010 -0.0004
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
4th quartile 0.009 0.009* 0.002
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
constant 0.035*** 0.024*** -0.071*** 0.058*** 0.016*** -0.072***
(0.014) (0.001) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005) (0.013)
n=27,328
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Table 1.9 – continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Preferred efficiency specification, α=.95
∆γ̂α(x ,y) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.012 -0.013
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.014) (0.013)
∆γ̂α(x ,y)*2nd quartile -0.006 -0.005
(0.008) (0.008)
∆γ̂α(x ,y)*3rd quartile 0.0001 0.0005
(0.001) (0.0009)
∆γ̂α(x ,y)*4th quartile -0.011*** -0.006*
(0.003) (0.003)
S&P return 0.554*** 0.5518*** 0.554*** 0.553*** 0.550***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014)
2nd quartile 0.003 -0.114*** -0.083**
(0.006) (0.030) (0.030)
3rd quartile 0.009* 0.009 -0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
4th quartile 0.009 0.009 0.0001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
constant 0.035*** 0.024*** -0.071*** 0.058*** 0.016*** -0.707***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005) (0.013)
n=27,386
Preferred efficiency specification, α=.90
∆γ̂α(x ,y) -0.001 -0.001 -0.0003 -0.001 -0.011 -0.012
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.011) (0.010)
∆γ̂α(x ,y)*2nd quartile -0.005 -0.003
(0.007) (0.006)
∆γ̂α(x ,y)*3rd quartile 0.0001 0.0004
(0.0009) (0.0008)
∆γ̂α(x ,y)*4th quartile -0.009*** -0.004**
(0.002) (0.002)
S&P return 0.554*** 0.511*** 0.554*** 0.554*** 0.550***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014)
2nd quartile 0.003 0.003 -0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
3rd quartile 0.009* 0.009 -0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
4th quartile 0.009 0.008 0.0004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
constant 0.035*** 0.024*** -0.071*** 0.058*** 0.016*** -0.071***
(0.014) (0.001) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005) (0.013)
n=27,328
NOTE: Specification (3) includes time fixed effects, Specification (4) includes quartile dummies,
Specification (5) includes quartile dummies and interaction terms, and Specification (6) includes
quartile dummies, interaction terms, and time fixed effects.
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Restricting the Size of Banks May
Have Costs
2.1 Introduction
The last two decades have seen tremendous change in the U.S. banking sector.
Commercial banks have increased in size and consolidated significantly, reducing their
numbers by about half since the mid 1980s. Concurrently, bank holding companies
(BHCs) have developed steadily during this period; between 1986 and 2005, both
their average size measured by total assets and their number almost doubled. The
average size of the 1,208 BHCs operating in 1986 was $3.4 billion. By 2005, the
average size of BHCs reached almost $7 billion of assets, with 2,276 BHCs operating
in the U.S.
BHCs are companies that own or control one or more commercial banks. Most
banks in the U.S. are owned by bank holding companies (BHCs). Currently, about
84 percent of commercial banks in the U.S. are part of a BHC structure. More than
75 percent of small banks with assets of less than $100 million are owned by BHCs;
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this percentage increases to 100 percent for large banks with more than $10 billion in
assets. About 60 percent of minority-owned banks are owned by BHCs.
A typical BHC consists of the parent holding company and one or more sub-
sidiary banks, and perhaps also non-bank subsidiaries. Large BHCs may have hun-
dreds of subsidiary banks and non-banks, although the trend since the 1990s has
been toward consolidation; indeed, some BHCs have consolidated all their subsidiary
banks into a single bank with interstate branches. From a legal standpoint, organi-
zation as a BHC provides advantages in terms of borrowing money, acquiring other
banks and non-bank entities, and issuing stock. On the other hand, the downside to
organization as a BHC involves additional regulatory scrutiny beyond that incurred
by commercial banks.
Prior to 1994, U.S. federal law prohibited commercial banks from operat-
ing branches across state lines. BHCs, however, were allowed to own commercial
banks in different states, and hence organization as a BHC allowed bank owners to
achieve greater geographic diversification subject to various regulatory restrictions.
The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) of 1994
repealed restrictions on interstate branching, allowing BHCs to consolidate their hold-
ings by merging the portfolios of member banks in different states. Subsequently, the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 repealed the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933
which had prohibited banks as well as BHCs from engaging in various non-banking
financial activities such as securities underwriting and dealing, insurance agency and
underwriting activities, and merchant banking activities. The GLBA permitted BHCs
to operate as financial holding companies (FHCs), allowing existing BHCs to acquire
full-service securities firms and insurance companies, as well as allowing securities
firms and insurance companies to acquire banks (and thereby become a BHC).1
1For a BHC to be eligible to declare itself an FHC, all of the BHCs depository institution
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The rapid growth of BHCs since the 1990s may be due in large part to passage
of the IBBEA and GLBA. Regulators and economists have long worried about the
efficacy of allowing financial institutions to grow until they become “too big to fail,”
and the recent financial crisis that began in 2007 has regenerated the debate (e.g., see
Reich, 2008). Various proposals have been discussed in the U.S. Congress that would
limit the size and activities of BHCs and FHCs while increasing regulatory scrutiny.
This cause has been taken up in the press (e.g., Goodman, 2008; ODriscoll, 2009).
Johnson (2009), writing in the New York Times Economix blog, states:
“If you are too big to fail, credit markets see you as lower risk and as a more
attractive investmentenabling you to obtain more financing on cheaper terms, and
thus become even larger. Everyone agrees, in principle, that this is a bad arrangement.
Its an unfair distortion of markets, giving huge banks the opportunity to grow bigger,
because they have implicit government guarantees.”
While there may well be good reasons to worry about moral hazard and other
issues arising from BHCs that might be regarded as too big to fail, there are also po-
tential costs from limiting the size of BHCs. We examine returns to scale among U.S.
BHCs using fully non-parametric regression techniques and find substantial evidence
of increasing returns to scale up to the largest BHCs operating today. Our empirical
findings suggest that limiting the size of BHCs would result in costs to society in
terms of foregone economies, and that these losses would not be trivial. While we do
not estimate the benefits of limiting BHCs sizesthis would involve substantial uncer-
subsidiaries must be well-capitalized and well-managed and have satisfactory or better ratings under
the Community Reinvestment Act. Small BHCs have a different legal treatment than the other
BHCs. Small BHCs are exempt from the consolidated BHC capital guidelines to which larger
organizations are subject. The capital adequacy of small BHCs is based on the banks capitalization,
just as if the BHC were not present. This means that the BHC, within reasonable parameters
determined by its ability to service and retire debt, can use lesser forms of capital or debt funding
to provide, for example, equity capital to the bank or to help fund an acquisition. In addition, small
BHCs also enjoy simplified reporting requirements. See the Report of Governors (2003) and Heller
and Fein (2006) for additional details and discussion.
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taintycosts such as those that we find would necessarily reduce any net benefits, and
might outweigh any such benefits depending on their magnitude.
It is apparently widely believed that scale economies in banking are exhausted
at a relatively small size; Johnson (2009) remarks that “There is no evidence for
economies of scale or scopeor other social benefitsfrom banks with assets above $100
billion.” Most researchers have found scant evidence of significant scale economies in
banking; a number of early studies, using data on U.S. commercial banks, found
that scale economies are exhausted at $100-$200 million of total assets. Mester
(2005) notes that recent changes in regulation, in particular the changes in branch-
ing restrictions, may account for some of the differences in terms of estimated scale
economies between earlier and more recent studies. However, many of these studies
estimated parametric cost functions that fail the most basic specification tests.2 Us-
ing non-parametric and semi-parametric methods, McAllister and McManus (1993)
and Wheelock and Wilson (2001) found that commercial banks face increasing re-
turns to scale up to at least $500 million of total assets. Feng and Serilitis (2009)
also find that large commercial banks face increasing returns to scale in a study of
292 commercial banks with at least $1 billion of total assets during 2000-05. Their
study relies on Bayesian estimation of a translog output distance function, and avoids
the need for input prices which may be subject to considerable measurement error.
As the authors acknowledge, however, the translog specification is suitable only for
samples composed of relatively homogeneous firms.
The evidence for returns to scale among BHCs is similarly mixed. Stiroh
(2000) used four different translog specifications of cost functions for BHCs to exam-
ine the performance of BHCs between 1991 and 1997. Stirohs results suggest modest
2See McAllister and McManus (1993) and Mester (2005) for discussions of the older literature on
bank scale economies.
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economies of scale for all years, with the exception of BHCs with assets between
$200 million and $300 million, for which modest diseconomies are found. The re-
sults suggest that the optimal BHC scale increased in the 1990s, and then stabilized.
Evanoff (1998) similarly finds only evidence of minor scale economies after estimating
a translog shadow cost function for 164 large banks that are part of a BHC. Hughes
et al. (2001) find evidence of scale economies among large BHCs while controlling for
risk; their estimates are also derived from a translog specification. Vennet (2002) also
estimates a translog cost function specification to analyze a sample of 2,375 European
financial institutions from 17 countries for 1995 and 1996, and reports finding no sig-
nificant evidence of either increasing or decreasing scale economies for large universal
banks and financial conglomerates.
Much of the research on scale economies in the banking industry has employed
fully parametric translog specifications for cost functions. We find that our data
trivially reject the translog specification. Rejection of the translog form for BHCs
cost function is hardly surprising; McAllister and McManus (1993) and Wheelock and
Wilson (2001, 2010) easily reject the translog specification for bank cost functions,
and Wheelock and Wilson (2011) find do so similarly while examining credit unions.
Consequently, we use fully non-parametric methods to estimate scale economies. We
use our estimates and some “back of the envelope” calculations to obtain an idea of
the costs, in terms of foregone scale economies, of restricting the size of BHCs.
In the next section, we present our model of BHCs costs and discuss the mea-
sures of scale economies that we estimate. Our methods of estimation and inference
are discussed briefly in Section 2.3, with technical details given in Appendix A. Sec-
tion 2.4 presents our discussion of the empirical results, and conclusions are given in
the final section.
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2.2 The Cost Model
To estimate scale economies we must first specify a model of costs for BHCs.
Two issues are involved: (i) the choice of appropriate variables, and (ii) given these
variables, the mapping of output quantities, input prices, and other arguments of the
cost relationship.
With regard to variable specification, we define the following variables giving
quantities of outputs: real estate loans (Y1), commercial loans (Y2), consumer loans
(Y3), other loans (Y4), securities (Y5), and off-balance sheet items (Y6) consisting
of total non-interest income minus service charges on deposits.3 We consider three
variable input quantities: (i) purchased funds, consisting of the sum of total time
deposits of $100,000 or more, allowance for loan and lease losses, and allocated transfer
risk reserves less the difference between total assets and the sum of total deposits and
total equity capital; (ii) core deposits, consisting of total deposits less time deposits
of $100,000 or more; and (iii) labor services, measured by the number of full-time
equivalent employees on payroll at the end of each quarter. We measure the prices of
purchased funds (W1), core deposits (W2), and labor services (W3) by dividing total
expenditure on the given input by its quantity. Variable cost (COST) is the sum of
expenditures on these three inputs. Finally, we define two fixed net-put quantities:
physical capital, consisting of premises and other fixed assets (Z1), and financial
equity capital (Z2).
With the exception of labor input (which is measured as full-time equivalent
employees) and off-balance sheet output (which is measured in terms of net flow of
income), our inputs and outputs are stocks measured by dollar amounts reported
3Of the commonly used measures of off-balance sheet output, this definition is the most consis-
tently measurable across banks and over time; Clark and Siems (2002) discuss alternative measures
of off-balance sheet activity.
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on bank balance sheets, consistent with the widely used “intermediation” model of
Sealey and Lindley (1977).
In addition to the variables defined above, we index quarters 1986.Q3 through
2009.Q2 by setting T = 1 for 1986.Q3, T = 2 for 1986.Q4, . . ., T = 92 for
2009.Q2. Since BHCs are observed at regular, quarterly intervals, we treat T an
ordered, categorical variable. In addition, we define a binary dummy variable D,
equal to one for BHCs that are held by a parent holding company, or zero otherwise.
Our data for individual banks are from the quarterly Bank Holding Company
Performance Reports (Call Reports) for U.S. BHCs for 1986.Q3 through 2009.Q2. We
omitted BHCs with missing or negative values for any input or output, and converted
dollar values to constant year-2000 prices using the GDP deflator. After pooling the
data across quarters, 135,635 observations are available for estimation, with from
918 to 2,219 observations in each quarter. Beginning in 2006.Q1, only BHCs with
total assets exceeding $500 million filed Call Reports; we include available data from
2006Q1–2009Q3 to aid estimation, but we focus on 1986Q4, 1995Q4, and 2005Q4 in
reporting our results in order to facilitate comparisons across time. Table 2.1 reports
summary statistics as of the fourth quarters of 1986, 1995, and 2005 for total assets
and the variables described above.
The distribution of total assets among BHCs in the U.S. is extremely wide and
skewed to the right. Figure 2.1 shows kernel density estimates for (inflation-adjusted)
total assets in 1986.Q4, 1995.Q4, and 2005.Q4. The dotted curve gives the density
estimate for 1986.Q4; the dashed curve for 1995.Q4, and the solid curve represents
2005.Q4. Total assets are measured in 1,000s of year-2005 U.S. dollars. The densities
for each period are skewed to the right, despite the use of a log scale on the figures
horizontal axis, although the skewness is less than what one finds for commercial
banks in the U.S. over a similar period (see Wheelock and Wilson, 2001, 2010 for
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comparison). The density estimates also reveal that the distribution of BHC sizes
has shifted to the right, reflecting the increase in mean (and median) BHC size over
time.
The variables defined above suggest the following mapping:
(Y1, Y2, Y3, Y4, Y5, Y6, Z1, Z2,W1/W3,W2/W3, T,D)→ COST/W3, (2.1)
where COST, W1, and W2 have been divided by the price of labor services, W3, to
maintain homogeneity with respect to input prices. In order to reduce dimensionality,
which has a heavy cost in terms of convergence rates of our non-parametric estimator,




= C(y,w) + ε, (2.2)





Z1 Z2 T D], and ε is a random
error with E(ε) = 0 and V AR(ε)=σ2(y,w). Given that the expectation of ε equals
0, C(y,w) = E(COST | y,w) is a conditional mean function that can be estimated
by various regression techniques.
Now consider a particular point (y0, w0) in the space (y,w). The set of points
R0=(θy0, w0) | θ ∈ (0,∞) comprises a ray along which the outputs (Y1+Y2+Y3+Y4),
Y5, and Y6 are produced in constant proportion to one another. Ray scale economies
can be evaluated by examining how expected cost varies along this ray, providing
insight into returns to scale along the ray R0 is given by






where j indexes the elements in y. The elasticity in (2.3) is the multi-product analog of
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marginal cost divided by average cost on the rayR0 with η(y,w)(<, =, >)1 implying
(increasing, constant, decreasing) returns to scale as outputs in y are expanded along
the ray R0. Banks for which η(y,w) 6= 1 are not competitively viable; if BHCs are
subject to the normal rules of competitive behavior, either a smaller or a larger firm
could drive a BHC with η(y,w) 6= 1 from a competitive market.
The measure defined in (2.3) requires estimation of derivatives of the cost
function. We employ fully nonparametric estimation methods, as discussed below in
Section 2.3. Nonparametric estimates of derivatives of a function are typically noisier
than estimates of the function itself.4 Hence, we define the ratio




It is straightforward to show that
∂S(θ | y0,w0)
∂θ
<=> 0⇐⇒ η(y0,w0) <=> 1; (2.5)
i.e., S(θ | y0,w0) is decreasing (constant, increasing) in θ if returns to scale are increas-
ing (constant, decreasing) at (θy0,w0) along the ray R0 passing through (y0,w0). In
addition, S(1 | y0,w0)= 1 by definition. Thus, we investigate ray scale economies
(RSE) along a ray R0 by estimating C(y0,w0) and C(θy0,w0) for various values of
θ, and using confidence bands to determine whether S(θ | y0,w0) is downward or
upward sloping.
In the empirical analysis below, we define the fixed point (y0,w0) by taking
medians of the variables in our model. Of course, few if any BHCs may be located
along the ray R0. Although RSE is a convenient measure of scale economies, it may
4This is particularly true for the present case where we would require derivatives in several
dimensions; in addition, bandwidth selection becomes problematic when estimating derivatives in
more than one dimension.
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be misleading if most BHCs are located “far” from R0. As an alternative to RSE,
we also consider scale economies along each BHCs expansion path, i.e., along the
path which holds each BHCs output mix constant. Consider a BHC operating at the
point (y0,w0), with cost C(y0,w0). Let γ be a small positive number, say 0.05, and
consider how cost changes as we move from ((1− γ)y0,w0) to ((1 + γ)y0,w0); along
this path, the output mix remains constant in the sense that relative proportions are
maintained. Now let θ(1− γ)y0 = (1 + γ)y0; then θ = (1 + γ)/(1− γ) ≈ 1.1053.
The following expression provides a measure of expansion-path scale economies









A BHC operating at (y0,w0) experiences (decreasing, constant, increasing)
returns to scale along the path from ((1−γ)y0,w0) to ((1+γ)y0,w0) as ε0(>,=, <)1.
Our measure ε0 provides an indication of returns to scale faced by a particular BHC
along the path from the origin through the BHCs observed output vector, starting at a
level equal to 95-percent of the quantities in y0 and continuing to a level equal to 105-
percent of the quantities in y0, or 110.53 percent of the starting point at (1−γ)y0 for
γ= 0.05. Hence ε0 measures the increase in cost resulting from an increase in output
by a factor of θ; when output increases by a factor of θ, cost increases by a factor (ε0
x θ).
The RSE and EPSE measures are both defined in terms of a BHCs cost func-
tion. The following section discusses a strategy for estimating the cost function
non-parametrically, which in turn allows us to estimate, and make inference about,
these measures of scale economies.
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2.3 Estimation and Inference
Various approaches exist for estimating regression functions (i.e., conditional
mean functions) such as the one defined above in (2.2). A common approach, partic-
ularly in banking studies, is to estimate the conditional mean function parametrically
using a translog specification. However, because the translog function is merely a
quadratic specification in log-space, this approach limits the variety of shapes the
cost function is permitted to take. Further, because the translog is derived from a
Taylor expansion of the cost function around the mean of the data, it makes little
sense to use a translog specification to attempt inference about returns to scale over
units of widely varying size.
In order to test our suspicions about the translog specification, we performed
separate specification tests using data for each of the 92 periods (1986Q3–2009Q2)
represented in our data. For each period, we divided the data into two subsets
consisting of BHCs with total assets less than or equal to median total assets for
the given period, and BHCs with total assets greater than the median. Using the
variables listed in (2.1), but not summing the four loan variables Y1, Y2, Y3, and Y4
but rather including them as separate variables, for each period we estimated separate
translog cost functions using the two sub-samples, and then performed a Wald test
using Whites (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator to test
equivalence of parameters vectors across the two sub-samples. We rejected the null
hypothesis of equality in each of the 92 cases, with p-values ranging from 1011.51 to
10−211.60.
Rejection of the translog functional form is hardly surprising. Several studies
have noted that the parameters of a translog function are unlikely to be stable when
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the function is fit globally across units of widely varying size.5 The problem suggests
the use of nonparametric estimation methods. Although nonparametric methods are
less efficient than parametric methods in a statistical sense when the true functional
form is known, nonparametric estimation avoids the risk of specification error when
the true functional form is unknown, as in the present application.
Given that the translog specification is trivially rejected by our data, we use
a fully nonparametric, local-linear estimator augmented to handle the discrete co-
variate D and the ordered categorical variable T along the lines used by Wheelock
and Wilson (2011). Nonparametric regression models may be viewed as infinitely
parameterized; as such, any parametric regression model (such as the translog cost
function) is nested within a nonparametric regression model. Clearly, adding more
parameters to a parametric model affords greater flexibility. Nonparametric regres-
sion models represent the limiting outcome of adding additional parameters, and can
be viewed as nesting various parametric models such as the translog specification as
well as others.6
5See, for example, Guilkey et al. (1983) and Chalfant and Gallant (1985) for Monte Carlo
evidence, and Cooper and McLaren (1996) and Banks et al. (1997) for empirical evidence involving
consumer demand. Still others have found a similar problem while estimating cost functions for
hospitals (Wilson and Carey, 2004), for US commercial banks ( (McAllister and McManus, 1993;
Mitchell and Onvural, 1996; and Wheelock and Wilson, 2001), and for credit unions (Wheelock and
Wilson, 2010); hospitals, banks, and credit unions all vary widely in terms of size.
6Fan and Gijbels (1996, chapter 1) and Hardle and Linton (1999) give nice descriptions of non-
parametric regression and the surrounding issues. Note that several possibilities for nonparametric
regression exist. For example, orthogonal series estimators based on the ideas of Szeg (1959) and
Gallant (1981, 1982) involve representing the conditional mean function by an infinite Fourier series
and using orthogonal polynomials (e.g., Laguerre or Legendre polynomials) or other functions (e.g,
transcendental functions or Muntz-Satz expansions) to represent the basis functions, and have been
used in studies of bank costs and elsewhere. One must choose a truncation point for the Fourier
series; cross-validation and other methods (e.g., Eastwood, 1991) may be used, although published
papers using this approach to analyze banks have typically not optimized the number of terms ac-
cording to such criteria. In addition, Barnett et al. (1991) note that the basis functions with which
Gallants model seeks to span the neoclassical function space are sines and cosines, despite the fact
that such trigonometric functions are periodic and hence are far from neoclassical. In other words,
the basis functions, which should be dense in the space to be spanned do not themselves even lie
within that space. Instead of trigonometric functions, one could use as the basis functions members
of a family of orthogonal polynomials, but the problems of determining the optimal number of terms,
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Precise details of our estimation procedure are given in the Appendix. We
use a dimension-reduction technique along the lines of Wilson and Carey (2004) and
Wheelock and Wilson (2011) to help mitigate the slow convergence rate of our estima-
tor; the technique involves transforming the data to principal-components space and
then dropping the principal components that are nearly redundant in terms of the
independent linear information that they contain. We incorporate the binary dummy
variable D and the ordered categorical variable T into our estimation by augment-
ing the kernel weights in our local linear estimator with additional kernel functions
for these variables as used by Racine and Li (2004), Wilson and Carey (2004), and
Wheelock and Wilson (2011). This approach requires three bandwidth parameters,
with one controlling the degree of smoothing among the continuous covariates, one
controlling the degree of smoothing across the two sub-samples defined by the binary
variable D, and with the third controlling the degree of smoothing over time, repre-
sented by T. Inference is made using the wild bootstrap proposed by Hardle (1990)
and Hardle and Mammen (1993). See the Appendix for further details.
2.4 Empirical Results
As discussed in the Appendix, values for the three bandwidth parameters h0,
h1, and h2 are needed for estimation. Using the Nelder and Mead (1965) simplex
algorithm with the BHC data to optimize the least-squares cross-validation function
in (A.15) yields h0 = 0.00768236, h1 = 0.974708, and h2 = 0.657994. Given our sample
size of n = 135,635 and our use of a nearest-neighbor bandwidth for the continuous
dimensions in our model, we have k = [h0n] = 1,041 so that smoothing is over the 1,041
and using these in a non-linear, maximum-likelihood framework, remain. As a practical matter, in
the present multivariate setting with a large number of observations, this method would incur the
numerically challenging problem of inverting very large moment matrices. Our local-linear estimator
avoids these problems.
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nearest neighbors of a given, fixed point. As discussed in the Appendix, smoothing
in the continuous dimensions is accomplished using a spherical Epanechnikov kernel
function; consequently, observations closer to the point of interest receive more weight,
while those farther way receive less weight. Only the 1,041 observations closest to the
given point of interest receive non-zero weight in the estimation.
Table 2.2 presents summary statistics for our estimates of EPSE by size quar-
tile for each of the three periods we consider. Recalling that values of the EPSE
measure defined in (2.6) less than one indicate increasing returns to scale, the results
suggest evidence of increasing returns. The results in Table 2.2, however, merely
describe the empirical distributions of point estimates. In order to test statistical
significance, we used the bootstrap procedure described in the Appendix to estimate
95-percent confidence intervals for εi in each of the three periods. We then tabulated,
for each size-quartile in each period, how many observations had confidence intervals
lying to the left of one, covering one, or lying to the right or one.
The results of this analysis are shown in Table 2.3, where the totals are tallied
for each size–quartile in each period. In addition, the confidence interval estimates are
plotted in Figures 2.4-2.6 after sorting the interval estimates by their upper bounds
in each size quartile. The results are striking. In each period, almost all BHCs are
shown to face significant increasing returns to scale, in all size groups. Constant re-
turns to scale cannot be rejected for only a few BHCs, and there is not evidence that
any BHCs face decreasing returns to scale. Moreover, for those that face (statisti-
cally) significant increasing returns to scale, Figures 2.4-2.6 reveal that the estimated
confidence intervals upper bounds like well below one (i.e., the distance between one
and the upper bound of each confidence interval estimate is typically much greater
than the width of the estimated confidence intervals.
In 2005.Q4, for only 15 BHCs in the largest size-quartile can constant returns
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to scale not be rejected. One might reasonably ask how many BHCs in the same size-
quartile are larger than each of these 15 BHCs. Among these 15 BHCs, the number
of BHCs that are larger ranges from 3.52 percent to 97.71 percent of the BHCs in
the same size-quartile; for 6 of the 15 BHCs, more than half of BHCs in the same
size-quartile are larger. The 15 BHCs in the largest size-quartile for which constant
returns cannot be rejected are not the largest BHCs. The evidence for increasing
returns to scale among the very largest of BHCs seems quite strong.
We performed a similar analysis on BHCs for the last two quarters covered by
our data (i.e., 2009.Q1 and 2009.Q2), although in Tables 2.2-2.3 the last period we
report for is 2005.Q4 since after 2005.Q4, only banks with more than $500 million
of total assets reported FR-Y9C data as discussed earlier. The results for 2009.Q1
and 2009.Q2, however, are very similar to those in the other quarters we examined.
Table 2.4 shows total assets (in current dollars) of the 12 largest BHCs operating in
the U.S. as of June 30, 2010; all of these except the eighth largest, Barclays Group
US Inc., appear in our sample (Barclays is missing due to missing data needed to
construct our variables). In 2009.Q1, the largest BHC for which we cannot reject
constant returns to scale in favor of increasing returns using our EPSE estimates and
corresponding estimated 95-percent confidence intervals is Taunus Corporation, with
total assets of $372.75 billion (2010 dollars) at the end of 2009.Q1. The next-largest
BHC for which we cannot reject constant returns is South Plains Financial, Inc., with
total assets of $1.98 billion (2010 dollars) at the end of 2009.Q1. For 2009.Q2, South
Plains Financial, Inc. is the largest BHC for which we cannot reject constant returns
to scale. Consequently, we find evidence of increasing returns up to and including the
largest BHCs operating in the U.S.
Our estimates of RSE are illustrated in Figure 2.2 for D = 0 (i.e., for BHCs
that are not held by another holding company) and in Figure 3 for D = 1 (i.e., for
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BHCs that are held by another holding company. In both figures, RSE estimates are
plotted as a solid line, while bounds of corresponding 95 percent confidence interval
estimates are plotted with dashed lines. On the horizontal axes, θ (plotted on a
logarithmic scale) serves as a scaling parameter, with θ =1 corresponding to the
“median BHC” in each period.
The results in Figures 2.2-2.3 are very similar across the two groups of BHCs.
Recalling that the RSE measure is defined in (2.4) so that downward sloping rela-
tionships indicate increasing returns to scale along the ray from the origin through
the medians of the data, it is apparent that the results indicate increasing returns to
scale throughout the range of BHC sizes in each period, Hence our results for RSE are
consistent with our results for EPSE. Overall, we find strong evidence that increasing
returns to scale prevail throughout the size distribution of BHCs.
As discussed in Section 2.1, recent policy discussions among regulators and
lawmakers have considered the idea of restricting the size of large BHCs. While there
may be good reasons for doing so, our evidence points to some of the costs that would
result from such policies. Table 2.5 shows our EPSE estimates and corresponding 95-
percent confidence interval estimates for the four BHCs with total assets exceeding
$1 trillion in 2009.Q1 and 2009.Q2. The estimates are similar across the two quarters
as well as across the four BHCs. The average of the EPSE estimates shown in Table
2.5 is 0.9162; the averages of the lower and upper bounds of the estimated 95-percent
confidence intervals are 0.9082 and 0.9276, respectively.
Recall from the discussion in Section 2.2 following (2.6) that the expansion-
path scale economy measure measures the increase in costs when output increases by
a factor θ. If output increases by a factor θ, then costs increase by a factor (εxθ).
Alternatively, if output decreases by a factor 1/θ, then costs decrease by a factor
1/(εxθ); since θ ≈ 1.1053, a decrease in output levels by a factor 1/θ ≈ 0.9047 leads
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to a reduction in costs by a factor (εx1.1053). For Bank of America Corp. to reach
a size of $1 trillion of assets, it would have to shrink by a factor of about 1/2.366 ≈
0.4227. Setting 0.9047a = 0.4227 implies a ≈ 8.5979; using the average of the EPSE
estimates reported in Table 5, we could expect Bank of America Corp.s variable
costs to shrink by a factor of about (0.9162x1.1053)8.5979 ≈ 0.8974. In other words,
shrinking Bank of America Corp to a size of $1 trillion of total assets would likely
reduce its quarterly variable cost by only about 89.74 percent, or from $15.456 billion
(i.e., the average of its quarterly costs incurred in 2009.Q1 and 2009.Q2) to about
$13.870 billion–a reduction of about $1.586 billion.
Similar calculations using the average of the EPSE estimates shown in Table
2.5 reveal that shrinking the other three BHCs listed in Table 2.5 (i.e., J.P. Morgan
Chase, Citigroup, and Wells Fargo) to $1 trillion of total assets would reduce their
quarterly variable costs by 91.58, 92.03, and 97.47 percent (respectively). Using
averages of costs for the first two quarters of 2009 shown in Table 2.5, costs would
be reduced from about $10.447 billion to about $9.567 billion for J.P. Morgan Chase;
from about $10.293 billion to $9.473 billion for Citigroup; and from about $8.462
billion to $8.248 billion for Wells Fargo. Overall, shrinking each of the four largest
BHCs to $1 trillion of assets would reduce costs by a total of about $3.500 billion
per quarter. However, the values shown in Table 2.4 show that shrinking the four
largest BHCs to $1 trillion of total assets each would leave $3.544 trillion of assets
to be held by other BHCs. To give a conservative estimate (in view of our empirical
evidence of increasing returns to scale throughout the size-distribution of BHCs),
suppose that these assets are placed in 3.544 BHCs with assets of $1 trillion. The
average of the estimated quarterly variable costs after shrinking each of the four
largest BHCs as described above is $10.290 billion; 3.544 times this amount is $36.466
billion per quarter. Subtracting the amount saved in each of the four largest existing
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BHCs leaves about $32.966 billion per quarter, or about $131.864 billion per year.
While there may be good reasons to consider limiting the size of BHCs, our results
indicate that there would be non-trivial costs resulting from such a policy in terms
of foregone opportunities to exploit returns to scale, resulting in a mis–allocation of
resources, ceteris parabus.
2.5 Conclusion
We find strong evidence of increasing returns to scale throughout the size range
of BHCs operating in the U.S. We have used a fully non-parametric estimation pro-
cedure, after demonstrating that the widely used translog cost function specification
is easily rejected by our data. Use of fully non-parametric methods avoids any risk
of specification error, but comes at a cost of increased uncertainty surrounding our
estimates. Nonetheless, we find statistically significant evidence of increasing returns
to scale among the very largest BHCs.
While considering our rough estimate in Section 2.3 of constraining BHCs to
no more than $1 trillion of assetsabout $131.864 billion per yearone should remember
that financial crises happen not every year, but somewhat infrequently. These costs
(in terms of foregone scale economies) would accumulate to $1.329 trillion after ten
years, and to $2.637 trillion after twenty years. The cost of the recent financial crisis
is difficult to quantify, but our results suggest that the cost of constraining the size
of BHCs is quite large over time. Moreover, the benefits of constraining the size of
BHCs is far from certain in terms of how, whether, and to what degree such policy
might reduce the risk of future financial crises. In this paper, we have provided only
part of the analysis that should be considered in ongoing policy discussions, but we
believe it is an important piece of the puzzle.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics
Min 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile Max
–1986.Q4–
COST 515.39 4973.15 9189.47 31338.16 6852700.91
Y1 517.23 35905.08 87393.46 269712.62 67975240.00
Y2 188.23 22886.18 58442.10 208152.12 64391020.00
Y3 26.89 16327.11 39410.61 137146.67 54984416.00
Y4 0.00 6123.70 17680.68 71324.57 27922442.00
Y5 3136.59 52261.45 112549.44 331323.35 28526666.00
Y6 5806.56 120.21 422.32 2152.35 1738331.38
Z1 53.78 3279.34 7492.70 22195.36 5025185.50
Z2 115546.05 11373.50 27057.23 88256.70 14463423.00
W1/W3 157.83 419.92 497.05 627.26 13827.08
W2/W3 0.01 1.12 1.39 1.70 70.29
ASSETS 19626.22 192941.34 374067.08 1240296.22 310217024.00
–1995.Q4–
COST 393.55 4051.10 6634.98 19438.08 5697120.13
Y1 0.00 88200.17 153113.57 423406.27 82565792.00
Y2 0.00 21198.95 42328.79 124642.59 58636196.00
Y3 0.00 14962.73 33318.19 105555.92 66081012.00
Y4 0.00 2434.61 9533.55 40925.40 24542454.00
Y5 6116.35 85182.36 136944.40 367828.86 93733264.00
Y6 1686.89 195.72 514.38 2015.64 2538284.00
Z1 124.77 4495.82 8054.62 20717.29 5390948.50
Z2 3403.14 24035.10 38973.36 122362.11 24736954.00
W1/W3 335.82 863.56 1032.20 1336.49 278067.07
W2/W3 0.11 1.38 1.62 1.95 304.54
ASSETS 32560.98 259203.45 423738.08 1245432.28 314200416.00
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Table 2.1 – continued
Min 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile Max
–2005.Q4–
COST 446.43 2165.05 3425.43 7112.91 14311373
Y1 0 111115.1 190509.4 385150.4 324374976
Y2 0 18065.51 35103.69 73747 126887928
Y3 0 5146.81 10821.16 25205.49 172263904
Y4 0 1296.31 6235.86 20565.65 104254976
Y5 0 45128.07 78982.3 163520 383155776
Y6 423391.12 163.62 368.89 1072.7 9895471
Z1 64.46 3980.9 7148.66 14412.59 9004988
Z2 3260.48 19978.86 31849.16 64492.36 119586840
W1/W3 734.92 2368.26 2982.66 3925.15 2241650
W2/W3 0.02 1.56 1.88 2.31 1109.73
ASSETS 27413.6 231925.6 367558.4 735852.4 1481531264
NOTE: All variables (except binary dummy variable D) are measured in 1,000s of U.S. year-2005
dollars.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics for Expansion-Path Scale Economy Estimates by Size-
Quartile
Size Quartile Min 1st Quartile Median Mean 3rd Quartile Max
–1986.Q4–
1 0.9211 0.9351 0.9369 0.937 0.9387 0.9579
2 0.8893 0.9341 0.9356 0.9357 0.9371 0.977
3 0.8419 0.9322 0.934 0.9333 0.9358 0.9606
4 0.8959 0.926 0.9288 0.928 0.9311 0.9442
–1995.Q4–
1 0.8782 0.9265 0.9315 0.9316 0.936 1.0217
2 0.8851 0.9319 0.9345 0.9344 0.9378 0.9595
3 0.8932 0.9302 0.9335 0.9332 0.936 0.9723
4 0.8207 0.9234 0.927 0.9266 0.9302 0.9527
–2005.Q4–
1 0.8595 0.9131 0.9224 0.9221 0.9312 0.9684
2 0.8675 0.9264 0.9334 0.9324 0.94 0.9663
3 0.8848 0.9274 0.9326 0.9329 0.9385 0.9697
4 0.8819 0.923 0.9275 0.9285 0.9335 0.9627
NOTE: For each period, summary statistics are given for the first, second, third, and fourth quartiles
of BHCs total assets.
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Table 2.3: Expansion–Path Scale Economies, 95–percent Significance
Quartile IRS CRS DRS
–1986–
1 277 1 0
2 271 6 0
3 271 6 0
4 275 3 0
–1995–
1 319 1 0
2 316 3 0
3 318 1 0
4 316 3 0
–2005–
1 553 15 0
2 554 14 0
3 554 14 0
4 553 15 0
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Table 2.4: 12 Largest Bank Holding Companies as of 30 June 2010
BHC Total Assets
Bank of America Corp. $2,366,086,945,000
J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. 2,014,019,000,000
Citgroup, Inc. 1,937,656,000,000
Wells Fargo & Co. 1,225,862,000,000
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 883,529,000,000
Morgan Stanley 809,456,000,000
Metlife, Inc. 573,907,057,000
Barclays Group US, Inc. 356,186,000,000
Taunus Corporation 348,586,000,000
HSBC North America Holdings, Inc. 333,997,956,000
U.S. Bancorp 283,243,000,000
NOTE: Total assets measure in current (2010) dollars. Data were obtained from the Federal Reserve
Systems National Information Center.
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Table 2.5: EPSE Estimates for BHCs with Total Assets Exceeding $1 Trillion
BHC EPSE –95% CI– COST
–2009.Q1–
Bank of America Corp. 0.9155 0.9081 0.9282 $16.806
J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. 0.9144 0.9074 0.9246 10.883
Citgroup, Inc. 0.9168 0.911 0.9269 10.847
Wells Fargo & Co. 0.9173 0.9121 0.9262 8.509
–2009.Q2–
Bank of America Corp. 0.9164 0.9083 0.9294 14.106
J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. 0.915 0.902 0.9268 10.011
Citgroup, Inc. 0.9164 0.9052 0.9311 9.739
Wells Fargo & Co. 0.9175 0.9111 0.9278 8.415
NOTE: COST is (quarterly) total variable cost, measured in billions of 2010 dollars.
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Figure 2.1: Density of (Log) Total Assets for 1986.Q4, 1995.Q4, and 2005.Q4
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Figure 2.2: Ray Scale Economies (D = 0)
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Figure 2.3: Ray Scale Economies (D = 1)
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Figure 2.4: Expansion Path Scale Economies by Size–Quartile, 1986
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Figure 2.5: Expansion Path Scale Economies by Size–Quartile, 1995
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During the last three decades, the U.S. banking industry has undergone substantial trans-
formations. Major regulatory changes redefined the banking business environment: deregulation
of deposits accounts, changes in capital and reserve requirements, liberalization of the intrastate
and interstate banking, legal permission to banks to act in the insurance market, securitization
of traditional banking assets. In addition, significant technological changes and developments in
the financial services sector took place. The progress in telecommunications led to the globaliza-
tion of the financial industry, and the new technologies enabled innovation and engineering of new
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products, and improved risk-management techniques. As a result, the banking sector became more
competitive, facing strong competition from foreign banks too.
Boyd and Gertler (1993), Berger et al. (1995), Jones and Critchfield (2005) document the
transformation of the U.S. commercial banking scene, using various sources of data and time periods.
Overall, these studies conclude that between 1974 and now, the banking sector has experienced
substantial consolidation: the number of organizations declined significantly, while total assets in
the industry increased. But asset growth was not evenly distributed among firms, rather the largest
banks became significantly more concentrated.1 The way of doing business changed, with a rise
in off-balance-sheet activities, a decrease in business lending, increase in residential and business
mortgage lending, and a higher price for funds, due to the loss of monopsony power over depositors.
Evidence is presented to document the origins of the “too-big-to-fail” doctrine: since the 1980s, the
source of the problems in the banking sector was the increased risk taking by large banks that were
relatively unrestricted by the existing interstate restrictions.
The unit of observation in this paper is a BHC, a company that owns or controls one or more
banks. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 eliminated barriers which forced separation between
commercial banks and insurance companies; it allowed BHCs to engage in financial activities, includ-
ing securities underwriting and dealing, insurance agency and underwriting activities, and merchant
banking activities. The Act allows existing bank holding companies to acquire full-service securities
firms and insurance companies. In addition, the holding-company structure offers other attractive
features: BHCs can assume shareholders’ debt on a tax free basis, borrow money, acquire other
banks and non-bank entities more easily, and issue stock with greater regulatory ease. They have
to, however, respond to additional regulatory authorities. Klein and Saidenberg (1999) document
that, on average, BHCs are better diversified, do significantly more lending, and hold significantly
less capital, than their counterpart banks not part of a holding company.
This paper examines changes in the performance of BHCs over time, between 1988 and 2010.
I employ the nonparametric, unconditional, hyperbolic α-quantile estimator developed by Wheelock
and Wilson (2008) to estimate efficiency, that I then use to construct a hyperbolic version of the
1Jones and Critchfield (2005) document the differences in consolidation: the asset share of orga-
nizations with more than $10 billion in assets increased from 42 percent in 1984 to 73 percent in
2003. The same concentration pattern exists in terms of deposits: in 2003 three organizations were
holding 25 percent of the total deposits, while in 1984 there were 42 organizations holding a quarter
of the nation’s deposits.
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Malmquist index. I decompose the index in efficiency change and technology change to determine
the sources of changes at the industry level. The estimator employed presents several advantages
over the traditional parametric estimators: i) it measures efficiency along a hyperbolic path, so one
is not confronted with the puzzle of differences in estimates depending on the direction chosen; ii)
it is a partial estimator, thus only performance of firms in the neighborhood of the firm of interest
is relevant; iii) its convergence rate is comparable to that of parametric estimators (n1/2); and iv) it
is robust to outliers.
Different benchmarks are used to estimate efficiency; the three efficiency estimated are:
technical, cost and revenue efficiency. Technical efficiency refers to the ability to produce the most
output with a given amount of inputs. A firm is technically efficient if it is not possible to increase
output without increasing input usage. Cost efficiency takes into account input prices; it shows the
extent to which a firm minimizes its costs of producing some output, given the input prices that it
faces. Revenue efficiency refers to the maximum feasible revenue that can be generated from some
inputs, held constant, given market output prices.
Data presented in Table 3.1 suggest strong expansion has taken place: the number of BHCs
has been growing every year since 1986, with the exception of 1994, when the number of BHC
organizations declined by 17 percent. There is evidence of consolidation too. The size of the BHC
sector, as measured by total assets, has increased consistently, in each year since 1986 to 2005; in
1994, there was an increase in the total assets held by all operating BHCs of 9 percent, despite the
decline in the number of organizations, and much higher than the prior years’ average growth of
about 2 to 3 percent.2 Total assets held by BHCs were $3,192.74 billion in 1986, and $16,413.15
billion in 2005 (values in 2005 constant dollars), an increase higher than five-fold. Other changes
in the BHCs sector appear to be similar to the developments in the commercial banking sector:
i) the share of total loans in total assets has increased, while the share of securities has decreased
during the 1992-1995 period, ii) real estate lending has increased over time, while commercial and
industrial loans have decreased, iii) the share of deposits in total liabilities declines in favor of federal
funds, and iv) equity-to-assets ratio increased in 1994 (due to regulatory changes), but it continued
to decline (exception is the 1999-2000 dotcom bubble period) to historically low levels until 2005.
Changes in performance between 1988 and 1998, between 1988 and 2005, and 1998 and
2The explanation for the dramatic consolidation in 1994 is the passing of the Riegle-Neal Act,
that allowed interstate banking.
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2005 are examined. Also, changes relative to 2010 are examined, but the findings are interpreted
with a grain of salt, given the uncertainty about the true market value of many of assets held by
BHCs. These specific years were chosen to be analyzed for several reasons. Data availability ranges
from 1986 to present. The year 1988 was chosen since most banking institutions decided to write-off
most of their nonperforming international loans in 1987. However, the savings and loan (S&L) crisis
that affected the U.S. banking sector between 1980 and 1991, peaked between 1986 and 1990. More
than 1,300 banks failed during the S&L crisis, thus 1988 was a year when the banking sector faced
struggles to survive and, thus, (we assume) attempted to reorganize its production and change its
business model.3
The year 1998 was chosen because it was the last year before the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
was passed. This piece of legislation was an incentive for banking institutions that desired to act in
the insurance market to acquire the BHC status. Finally, 2005 was chosen for two reasons. First,
the financial crisis had not yet started, so one does not have to face the difficulty of pricing many of
the assets on the balance sheets after 2007. While accounting documents reflected the book value
at which they were acquired, markets were not able to provide information about their true market
values. Second, starting June 30th 2006, only BHCs with assets higher than $500 million have to
submit their quarterly reports, while the ones with lower assets had only to submit reports twice a
year, and not that detailed.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way: a short literature review is presented
in Section 3.2, the estimation procedure is detailed in Section 3.3, data and empirical results are
presented in Section 3.4, and Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
Berger at al. (1995) analyze in great detail trends for all federally insured banking institu-
tions between 1974 and 1994. They document the expansion of the industry, as measured by the
size of total assets from $3.26 trillion in 1974 to $4.02 trillion (1994 dollars), despite the reduction in
the number of banks from 12,463 to 7,926 (almost the entire reduction comes from the reduction in
the number of small banks). Regulatory changes triggered a transformation in the way the banking
3Boyd and Gertler (1993) point to the fact that this number is misleading: many failed banks
were large banks. They accounted for 4% of the failed banks, but for 60% of the total assets of failed
banks.
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of business was done. Banks faced an increase in the price of funds, due to loss of monopsony
over depositors and current competition with money market mutual funds. Other trends were the
increase in off-balance sheet activities and the reduction in commercial and industrial lending (a
market niche that was covered by foreign banks). Most of the largest banks increased their equity
to capital ratio. Technological and financial innovations led to improvements in credit analysis,
electronic funds transfers, and the development of the derivatives markets.
Boyd and Gertler (1995) show that between 1950 and 1994, at US commercial banks there
is an increase in loans, and a decline in cash and securities, due to the development of the money
markets. It appears that the share of each category of loans in banks’ portfolios has been unchanged
between 1952 and1973. On the liabilities side, they find that the importance of checkable deposits
diminished, in favor of interest-bearing liabilities: in the 1960’s, the share of checkable deposits of
total liabilities was 60%, and in the beginning of the 1990’s, it decreased to less than 20%. They
also document trends of declining equity capital-to-assets ratio until the 1980’s when the regulations
changed.
Stiroh (2000) examined the improved performance of BHCs between 1991 and 1997 and
found that the gains were mainly due to productivity growth and changes in scale economies. Es-
timated cost functions showed modest economies of scale, with th largest BHCs exhibiting the
strongest economies of scale. Berger et al. (1999) review the research on cost efficiency and found,
based on data from the 1980s and early 1990s, that there was little evidence of efficiency improve-
ment from mergers and acquisitions. Cost efficiency might depend on the type of merger and how
the merger is implemented. Demsetz and Strahan (1997) find that large BHCs had better diver-
sification across loan portfolios; it allowed them to operate with greater leverage and engage in
more risky, and potentially, more profitable, lending without increasing firm-specific risk. Berger et
al. (1996) examined a sample of banks over the period 1978 and 1990, and found evidence of small
cost economies and no evidence of statistically significant revenue economies, regardless of the bank
class size.
3.3 Estimation Approach
Productivity is typically defined as the amount of output obtained per unit of input used.
But when the production process involves multiple inputs and outputs, productivity can not be
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measured reliably by simple output-input ratios. Malmquist indices are usually used in the literature
to measure changes in productivity over time. A Malmquist index is defined in terms of ratios of
individual firm efficiencies estimated at different points in time and against different benchmarks.
Thus, in order to formally describe the Malmquist index, I have to define the efficiency concept first.
3.3.1 Efficiency Change
The economic theory defines a technology as the process through which production factors
are transformed into output. With a parametric set-up, many researchers assume a functional form
for the production function, usually a Cobb-Douglas function is assumed; but these functions do
not have microeconomics foundations, and exhibit properties unlikely to conform to reality. The
nonparametric approaches to analyzing efficiency rely on the microeconomics theory of the firm: it
is assumed a production set exists and it is closed by a frontier (referred to as the production frontier
or technology) that “envelops all the data observed,” hence the general name of data envelopment
techniques. Since these methods do not require specification of a functional relationship between
variables, few other assumptions are necessary. In particular, no assumptions about the frontier
shape or the distribution of inputs and outputs on the production set are necessary.
Technical efficiency refers to the ability to produce the most output with a given amount
of inputs. A firm is technically efficient if it is not possible to increase output without increasing
input usage, so estimating efficiency in a nonparametric framework involves comparing the individual
performance of one firm with a benchmark defined by (all or some) firms in the sample. Specifically,
efficiency is measured as the distance from where the firm lies in the input–output space to the
production frontier (technology) that envelops the data.
I use the unconditional hyperbolic α-quantile estimator developed by Daouia and Simar
(2007) Wheelock and Wilson (2008) to estimate efficiency. This estimator differs from “traditional”
estimators in several respects. First, the unconditional hyperbolic α-quantile estimator is a “partial”
frontier estimator, in the sense that the benchmark comparison consists of firms in the neighborhood
of the analyzed firm, and the desired size of the neighborhood can be chosen by the researcher.
Second, traditional estimators estimate the distance from a fixed data point to the full frontier in a
direction orthogonal to the output axis (in the input orientation case), or to the input axis (in the
output orientation case). If the sector analyzed operates under variable returns to scale, then the
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choice of input or output orientation has a big impact on the measured efficiency: a firm could lie
close to the frontier in the output direction, but far from it in the input direction, while another
firm could be close to the frontier in the input direction, but far from it in the output direction. The
α-quantile estimator allows estimation of the efficiency along a hyperbolic path, such that inputs
and outputs are adjusted simultaneously, rather than just in the input or output direction, and,
thus, overcoming the issue of direction choice. Finally, this estimator exhibits, unlike traditional
nonparametric estimators, desirable statistical properties: it is robust to outliers in the data and
has a high convergence rate, comparable to the parametric estimators’ convergence rate.
The formal discussion of the economic model and econometric estimation is based on Whee-
lock and Wilson (2008, 2010). Consider the following production possibilities set:
P ≡ {(x ,y) | x can produce y} ⊂ Rp+q+ , (3.1)
where x ∈ Rp+ and y ∈ R
q
+ denote vectors of inputs and outputs, respectively, and P
δ denotes the
upper boundary of the production set P, the technology frontier.
The goal is to estimate the distance from an observation, a point (x ,y), to the frontier P δ.
The hyperbolic-graph distance function measures the distance from a fixed point (x ,y) to P δ along
the hyperbolic path (γ−1x , γy), where γ ∈ (0, 1). The hyperbolic distance function is given by
γ(x ,y | P ) ≡ sup
{
γ > 0 | (γ−1x , γy) ∈ P
}
. (3.2)
Note that P represents the true production set. We only observe a sample of iid random variables
with probability density function f(x ,y) with support over P. The density f(x ,y) implies the
following probability function
H(x 0,y0) = Pr(x ≤ x 0,y ≥ y0), (3.3)
which gives the likelihood of drawing an observation from the f(x ,y) that weakly dominates the
agent operating at (x δ0,y
δ
0) ∈ P δ.4 The hyperbolic α-quantile distance function can be expressed as
γα(x ,y) = sup
{
γ > 0 | H(γ−1x , γy) > (1− α)
}
. (3.4)
4An observation (x̃, ỹ) weakly dominates (x, y) if x̃ ≤ x and ỹ ≥ y.
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For 0 < α < 1 and a fixed point (x ,y) ∈ Rp+q+ , γα(x ,y) > 1 gives the proportionate, simultaneous
decrease in inputs and increase in outputs required to move from (x ,y) along a path (γ−1x , γy),
γ > 0, to a point with (1− α) probability of being weakly dominated.
Note that the above estimation does not take into account the role of prices; in this sense,
technical efficiency is the most restrictive type of efficiency. It is possible for a firm to be technical
efficient, but to use a mix of inputs or outputs that are not optimal, i.e., a mix that does not minimize
cost, or maximize revenue, respectively. Cost and revenue efficiency are more inclusive efficiency
measures. Cost efficiency reflects the extent to which a firm minimizes its costs of producing some
output, given input prices faced and holding output constant. Formally, production cost is given
by w′xx, where wx denotes a w vector of input prices, and the set of feasible combinations of cost
and outputs is given by C(w | P ). Then, cost efficiency measured in the hyperbolic direction can
be estimated analogously to the technical efficiency estimation:
γα(w
′x,y | C(w | P )) ≡ sup
{
γ > 0 | (γ−1w′x , γy) ∈ C(w | P )
}
. (3.5)
For a firm facing input prices w, γα(w
′x ,y | C(w | P )) > 1 gives the proportionate, simultaneous
decrease in costs and increase in outputs, required to move for a point (w′x,y) to a point with
(1− α) probability of being weakly dominated.
Revenue efficiency refers to the maximum feasible revenue that can be generated from some
inputs, held constant, given market output prices. Similarly to cost efficiency, technical efficiency
does not imply revenue efficiency, but revenue inefficiency does imply technical inefficiency. Revenue
is given by z′yy, where zy denotes a q vector of output prices, and the set of feasible combinations of
inputs and revenues is given by R(z | P ). The estimation of the revenue efficiency in the hyperbolic
direction is given by:
γα(x , z
′y | R(z | P )) ≡ sup
{
γ > 0 | (γ−1x , γz′y) ∈ R(z | P )
}
. (3.6)
For a firm facing output prices z, γα(x , z
′y | R(z | P )) > 1 gives the proportionate, simultaneous
decrease in inputs and increase in revenue, required to move from a point (x , z′y) to a point with
(1− α) probability of being weakly dominated.
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3.3.2 Productivity Change
The Malmquist index measures total factor productivity change over time. The concept is
based on Malmquist (1953)’s idea of using distance functions to develop an index for productivity
change. I define the Malmquist index in terms of the hyperbolic α-quantile measure of efficiency.
Let P tα denote the production set at time t for the firms comprised in the set defined by the specified
α (production set defined analogously to the production set defined in (3.1)), and P δtα denote the
upper boundary of the production set P tα. The index is then given by:
Mα,i(t1 , t2 ) ≡
[
γ(xit2 ,yit2) | V(P
t1
α ))




γ(xit2 ,yit2) | V(P
t2
α ))






The term γα(xitk ,yitk) | V(P
tj )) is an estimate of the distance from firm i ’s location at time
tk to the boundary of V(P tj ), where V(P tj ) represents the convex cone of the hyperbolic α production
set (P
tj
α ). Fare and Grosskopf (1996) and Ball et al. (2005) showed that if the technology allows
for variable returns to scale, the index ignores the contribution of scale economies to productivity
growth. In order for the Malmquist index to indicate the true total factor productivity changes,
the index must be defined in terms of constant returns to scale, thus the convex cone is used rather
than the convex hull. With variable returns to scale, technically efficient firms operating along the
increasing or decreasing returns regions of the technology are less productive than the technically
efficient firms operating along the constant returns region of the frontier. The Malmquist index is
the geometric mean of two ratios that measure the change in productivity using as a benchmark the
convex cone of the set bounded by the technology prevailing at time t1 and t2 , respectively.
We can decompose the hyperbolic-quantile-based Malmquist index in a measure of α-
quantile-based efficiency change:




and a measure of the industry-wide technology change:










Eα,i(t1 , t2 ) measures the change in efficiency between times t1 and t2 , relative to the hyperbolic
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α-quantile frontiers at times t1 and t2 . An estimate lower than 1 shows an increase in technical
efficiency measured relative to the α-quantiles at times t1 and t2 , respectively; a value higher than 1
shows a decrease in technical efficiency. Tα,i(t1 , t2 ) is the geometric mean of two ratios that measure
the shift in the α-quantile frontier relative to a firm’s position at times t1 and t2 . Tα,i(t1 , t2 ) < 1
indicates that the α-quantile has shifted upwards, while a figure higher than 1 is indicative of the
downward shift of the frontier.
As one can define different efficiency measures, depending of the benchmark used. Ball
et al. (2005) and Wheelock and Wilson (2010) defined, similarly, different Malmquit indices and
their decompositions using various benchmarks. If a cost frontier is used, then the Malmquist cost
productivity can be defined as:
MCα,i(t1 , t2 ) ≡
[
γ(w′it2xit2 ,yit2) | V(Cα(wit1 , P
t1)))
γ(w′it1xit1 ,yit1) | V(Cα(wit1 , P t1)))
×
γ(w′it2xit2 ,yit2) | V(Cα(wit2 , P
t2)))





which can be decomposed into a measure of cost-efficiency change:







and a measure of industry-wide cost technology change:
















When a revenue frontier is employed, the Malmquist revenue productivity is defined as:

























the revenue-efficiency change measure as:
ERα,i(t1 , t2 ) =










and the industry-wide revenue technology change as:
T Rα,i(t1 , t2 ) ≡
[




















The measures given by (3.10) and (3.13) have the same qualitative interpretation as the
measure in (3.7), with the only difference that the benchmark is now given by V(Cα(wtj) | P tj ) and
V(Rα(ztj) | P tj ), respectively, and not by V(P
tj
α ). Similarly, the measures in (3.11) and (3.14) are
to be interpreted in a similar manner to the measure in (3.8), and the measures in (3.12) and (3.15)
similarly to the measure in (3.9).
3.4 Data and Results
3.4.1 Data
Data used in this paper are first quarter data from the FR 9Y-C forms that BHCs have to
submit quarterly to the Federal Reserve. Table 3.2 gives the definitions for the variables used as
inputs and outputs. For the technical efficiency and technology change, the following inputs were
used: labor, purchased funds, core deposits, physical capital, and equity capital. The considered
outputs were: real estate loans, business loans, consumer loans, other loans, securities, and off-
balance items. The choice of inputs/ outputs is in line with the current literature and is consistent
with the intermediation approach. Except labor, which is reported as number of full-time equivalent
employees, all inputs and outputs are in dollar figures. For the cost efficiency and cost technology
change, the cost variable was computed as the sum of inputs multiplied by their respective prices.
Note that no price is available for equity capital, thus equity was not considered in this set of
estimations. For the estimations that used as benchmark the revenue frontier, revenue is calculated
as the sum of securities and loans multiplied by their respective average prices. The off-balance
items output was not considered, for the same reason of not being able to identify a price for it.
Table 3.3 gives the summary statistics for the inputs and outputs used, for each of the
quarters examined. Figures are in thousands of 2005 constant dollars. Observations that had
missing or negative values for some inputs or outputs were dropped. The sample contains BHCs
that are very different, both in terms of size and activity. The median value is much lower than the
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mean value for each variable, in each quarter. Also, the minimum and maximum values reflect great
size differences. In terms of assets and liabilities, there are BHCs that do not lend in all markets,
and there are BHCs that do not attract funds from all potential savers.
Table 3.4 reports the number of BHCs in the sample, by year and by period. The sample is
not balanced, and less than 20% of the BHCs operating in 1988 were still operating in 2010: out of
the 1,323 BHCs operating in 1988, 575 were still in business in 1998, 432 in 2005, and only 262 in
2010. About 38% out of the BHCs operating in 1998 are present in our 2010 sample, and 37% out of
the BHCs operating in 2005. These figures are indicative of the consolidation trend in the industry
(though the decline in numbers for 2010 are an artifact of the changes in the reporting regulations).
3.4.2 Results
Tables 3.5–3.10 report estimates of the geometric mean changes of efficiencies and technolo-
gies by quartiles of total assets, where Q1 is the first quartile, and comprises the smallest 25% of
the total sample. The geometric, rather than the arithmetic mean is more appropriate, given the
multiplicative nature of the estimates. Each cell reports two numbers: the top one is the (geometric)
mean of the estimates for the observations that belonged to Qi in t1 and Qj in t2 . The reported
results are obtained for a value of α = 0.99 The bottom figure gives the number of BHCs in those
respective quartiles in the examined time periods. For instance, there were 48 BHCs that were
among the smallest 25% (Q1) in both 1988 and 1998, 29 BHCs that were among the smallest 25%
in 1988, but among the second-smallest (Q2) in 1998, 17 BHCs that were among the smallest 25%
in 1988, but among the third-smallest (Q3) in 1998, and only one that was among the smallest in
1988, and among the largest (Q4) in 1998.5
Table 3.5 reports the point estimates for the mean changes in efficiency for all the time
periods examined. I reiterate that the estimates pertaining to 2010 have to be interpreted with
caution, given the uncertainty about the true market value of some assets on the BHCs’ balance
sheets. The results suggest that most BHCs experienced a decline in mean efficiency between 1988
and 1998. BHCs that were in the first quartile in both 1988 and 1998, experienced a mean average
5The ranges of quartiles for each quarter are as following (in thousands of constant 2005 $):
for 1988, (0–174,916), (175,111-322,717), (323,387–799,782), and (800,997–3.09e+08); for 1998,
(0–251,421), (251,605–387,041), (387,291–900,654), and (905,441–4.32e+08), for 2005, (0–224,454),
(224,456–350,069), (350,190–692,398), and (693,495-1.52e+09); and for 2010, (0–569,968), (572,854–
848,887), (850,180–1,722,122) and (1,726,862–2.14e+09).
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decrease of about 3.1%, while those that were in the second largest quartile (Q3) in 1988 and moved
to the largest quartile (Q4) in 1998 experienced a mean decrease in efficiency of about 11.5%.
The BHCs that were among the largest in each of the two years experienced a mean increase
in efficiency of about 15.2%. The trend for the largest 1988 BHCs that were among the largest ones
in 2005 and 2010 was the same: an improvement in mean efficiency of 45% and 13% respectively.
An interesting pattern exists for the BHCs that belonged to the smallest quartile in 1988, but then
grew over time. With one exception, all their mean efficiencies appear to have worsened, with the
largest decline for banks that grew extensively, belonging to the largest class size in 2005 or 2010.
Estimates of the mean efficiency change between 1998 and 2005 presented in Table 3.5
suggest that, on average, all BHCs, in all class sizes, became more efficient, with the largest gains
for the firms that ended in the largest quartile in 2005. For the 1998–2010 time period, besides the
increase in average efficiency for the BHCs that ended up in the largest quartile, also BHCs that
ended up in the smallest quartile in 2010 seem to have experienced an increase in mean efficiency.
The results for the mean average changes between 2005 and 2010 show that BHCs that belonged to
the smallest or second smallest quartile in 2010 had, on average, improved their technical efficiency.
These results suggest that until 2005 (so before the onset of the current financial crisis), the largest
BHCs, or those that became larger over time, experienced, on average, improvements in technical
efficiencies. Also, it appears that there is no evidence of a “catching-up” effect, in the sense that
there are gains in performance due to large size: BHCs that were the largest in the beginning of one
period, and still belonged to the largest class size by the end of the period, consistently improved
their performance, while small BHCs that increased their size experienced worsened performance.
Table 3.6 reports estimates of the mean technology change. Estimates higher than 1 indicate
an downward shift of the technology (so a reduced production possibilities frontier), while values
lower than 1 reflect an upward shift of the frontier. Interestingly, for all time period examined,
except the period of 2005-2010, all BHCs, regardless of class size, experienced an downward shift of
the technology. For the 2005–2010 time period, BHCs that belonged to the two largest quartiles in
2005 experienced an upward shift of the frontier.
Cost efficiency changes estimates are presented in Table 3.7. These estimates are qualita-
tively similar to the technical efficiency ones. BHCs that were the largest in 1988 and continued
growing, such that they were part of the fourth quartile subsequently, experienced a mean improve-
ment in cost efficiency over time: they were 13.8% more cost efficient in 1998, 43.5% more cost
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efficient in 2005, and 29.9% in 2010. BHCs that were among the smallest in 1988, but increased
their size over time, became, on average, less cost efficient. Estimates for the 1998–2005 period
indicate that BHCs in all class sizes improved their cost efficiency, while between 1998 and 2010
all of them, except the ones in the largest two quartiles, experienced declines in cost efficiencies.
Cost efficiency declined on average between 2005 and 2010 for all BHCs, except for the ones in the
smallest class size. BHCs belonging to the fourth quartile in each year improved their cost efficiency
in all time intervals examined, except for 2005-2010 period, when they experienced a decrease in
mean cost efficiency of 18.2%.
Table 3.8 presents the estimates for the cost technology changes. There is evidence of
an upward shift in the cost frontier for almost all class sizes, for each time period, indicating an
increase in the cost of producing given amounts of output. Exceptions are the largest BHCs in
1988 – 2005 and 1998–2005 period, and the smallest BHCs during 2005-2010, that experienced an
downward shift of the α-cost frontier. Put together, the information in Tables 6 and 7 reveals
several things. First, for the time intervals 1988–1998, 1988–2005, 1988–2010, and 1998–2005, I find:
i) most BHCs became more cost-efficient and experienced an upward shift of the cost α-quantile,
suggesting that while most of them faced higher production costs, shifts in technology reduced their
distance from the frontier, thus the explanation for the increase in cost-efficiency; ii) the smallest
BHCs, that belonged to the first quartile in all years became more cost-inefficient, and experienced
an upward shift of the cost frontier, an indication of worsened productivity for these BHCs over
the time periods mentioned; and iii) the group of the largest BHCs became more cost-efficient and
experienced a downward shift in the partial cost frontier from 1988 to 2005 and 1998 to 2005, a sign
of improved cost–productivity over the time frames mentioned. Second, over the period 1998 and
2010, almost all BHCs experienced a decline in productivity, triggered by a simultaneous decrease
in mean efficiency and an upward shift of the cost frontier, while the large BHCs experienced higher
production costs as well, but they became, on average, more cost-efficient. Ultimately, between
2005 and 2010, all BHCs experienced a decline in cost– productivity, indicated by both decrease in
efficiency and increase in minimum production costs.
Table 3.9 reports the mean revenue efficiency changes. BHCs belonging to the fourth quartile
in each year, experienced positive changes in mean revenue efficiency, except for the time period of
2005 to 2010, when their revenue efficiency declined by 8.7%. BHCs of medium size (so those
that belonged to either second or third quartile) show a worsening, on average, of their revenue
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efficiency. The findings for the mean changes in revenue technology, reported in Table 10, show that
the α-quantile revenue frontier has shifted downward for all time periods, all class sizes, with two
exceptions: the BHCs that belonged to the largest quartile in both 2005 and 2010, and the ones
that belonged to the first quartile in 1998 and 2005. A downward shift of the revenue α-quantile
indicates that less revenue is generated from the output obtained with some given amount of input.
All six periods examined exhibit a similar pattern: the smaller the class size BHCs belong to, the
more dramatic the shift in the revenue frontier.
Combining the information from Tables3. 9 and 3.10, the findings suggest that medium-size
BHCs worsened their revenue-productivity over time, since they became less revenue-efficient and
faced a downward shift of the revenue frontier, for all time periods examined. Almost all smallest and
largest BHCs became more revenue-efficient, on average, but gained lower revenues (as evidenced
by the downward shift of the revenue frontier). Hence, the improvement in revenue-efficiency could
be attributed to the shift in the technology, that reduced their distance from the frontier.
3.5 Conclusion
The banking business environment has changed over the last decades significantly, due
to changes triggered by new legislation, or advancements in technology and finance. This paper
examines the performance of BHCs between 1988 and 2010 period, by analyzing mean changes in
technical, cost, and revenue efficiency, and mean changes in technology, cost technology and revenue
technology. I find that, over the years, the largest banks experienced the largest gains, in technical,
cost and revenue efficiency, with the exception of 2005 –2010 period, when the smallest BHCs seem
to have experienced gains in all efficiencies. Estimates of the technology change show an downward
shift of the α-quantile (i.e., a decrease in the output produced for some given input used), an upward
shift of the cost α-quantile (i.e., an increase in the minimum cost of producing some given output),
and downward shift of the revenue α-quantile (i.e., a decrease in the amount of revenue generated
from the output produced with some given amount of input), for most periods and class size, except
the large BHCs. These results indicate that the largest BHCs have improved their performance over
1988–2005 period, while the other BHCs experienced a worsening of their performance over time.
It is interesting to note that only the BHCs that belonged to the largest quartile appear
to have the highest gains. Over the time periods examined, the size of the BHCs had increased
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consistently. These findings are in line with the strand of literature that suggests that the cur-
rent legislation is conducive to consolidation, and to the strand of research documenting that large
banking institutions benefited more from the technological improvement and financial market glob-
alization. The findings are mixed for the small BHCs, and the medium-size BHCs appear to have
had negative changes in their efficiencies and technologies. These results support the literature that
finds that consolidation leads to benefits from greater diversification that are, in turn, offset by the
costs of increased risk-taking.
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Table 3.1: Number of BHCs over Time
Year Total number of
BHCs
BHCs with $500




1986 1,161 364 3,912.74
1987 1,345 352 3,933.03
1988 1,385 361 4,030.52
1989 1,423 372 4,036.71
1990 1,565 493 5,097.86
1991 1,589 506 4,923.58
1992 1,624 511 5,022.93
1993 1,616 476 5,148.76
1994 1,338 479 5,631.78
1995 1,342 499 5,940.39
1996 1,397 513 6,105.33
1997 1,456 537 6,435.55
1998 1,512 526 6,998.07
1999 1,643 546 8,257.72
2000 1,718 594 9,750.58
2001 1,800 628 10,814.77
2002 1,915 662 11,330.89
2003 2,059 718 12,210.92
2004 2,212 756 14,207.65
2005 2,294 792 16,413.15
2006 987 829 11,166.38
2007 973 862 11,672.89
2008 959 881 10,959.74
2009 999 946 13,996.48
NOTES:
1. Data for the first quarter in each respective year, except 1986 for which the information pertains
to the third quarter.
2. Data made publicly available by the Federal Reserve are based on the reports BHCs have to
submit quarterly. Since not all the BHCs have to report, these figures underreport the true number
of BHCs. The Report to the Congress on Financial Holding Companies under the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act (2003) states, for instance, that the total number of operating BHCs in December 2000
was 5,072, 5,090 in December 2001, and 5,094 in December 2002. These figures are approximately
three times higher than the total BHCs number from the publicly available data.
3. Data in constant 2005 dollars, deflated using the GDP Implicit Price Deflator.
4. The decline in the BHCs number reflects changes in regulation: starting 2006, the Federal Reserve
changed the requirements for the reporting BHCs: from a prior threshold of $150 million in assets,
starting with 2006, the threshold was increased to $500 million. Thus, though it is possible that the
number of BHCs decreased slightly too.
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Table 3.2: Variables Definitions
Labor – number of full-time equivalent employees
Purchased funds – time deposits over $100,000, federal funds purchased in domestic offices, secu-
rities sold under agreement to repurchase, trading liabilities, other borrowed money, subordinated
notes and debentures, subordinated notes payable to unconsolidated trusts issuing trust preferred
securities, and trust preferred securities issued by consolidated special purpose entities.
Core deposits – domestic transactions accounts, time deposits under $ 100,000, and savings
deposits
Physical capital – Premises and fixed assets (including capitalized leases)
Equity capital – total equity capital plus noncontrolling (minority) interests in consolidated
subsidiaries
Labor price – salaries and employee benefits/ labor
Purchased funds price – interest expense on time deposits of $100,000 or more, expense on
federal funds purchased and securities sold under agreements to repurchase, interest expense on
trading liabilities and other borrowed money, interest expense on subordinated notes and deben-
tures and on mandatory convertible securities / stock of purchased funds
Core deposits price – total interest on time deposits less than $ 100,000, plus interest on other
deposits/ stock of core deposits
Physical capital price – Expenses of premises and fixed assets, net of rental income (excluding
salaries and employee benefits and mortgage interest)/ Premises and fixed assets
Real estate loans – loans secured by real estate
Consumer loans – loans to individuals for household, family, and other personal expenditures
(includes purchased paper): credit cards, credit plans, other consumer loans
Business loans – commercial and industrial loans to US and non-US addressees
Other loans – total loans less real estate loans, business loans and consumer loans
Securities – held-to-maturity securities, available-for-sale securities, federal funds sold in domestic
offices, securities purchased under agreements to resell
Off-balance items – noninterest income minus service charges
Loans price – interest and fee income on loans in domestic offices/ total loans
Securities price – gains (losses) from held-to-maturity securities, plus gains (losses) from
available-for sale securities, plus interest income from federal funds sold and securities purchased
under agreements to resell/ stock of securities
Variable cost=(labor x labor price) + (purchased funds x purchased funds price) + (core deposits
x core deposits price) + (physical capital x physical capital price)
Revenue=[(real estate loans+business loans +consumer loans+other loans ) x loans price] +
(securities x securities price)
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max.
1988 n=(1,323)
cost 49,703 5,503 240,400 227 6,160,488
revenue 42,957 5,116 182,084 85 4,007,057
labor 1,052 138 4,347 7 90,000
purchased funds 744,801 44,613 3,884,490 0 88,036,536
core deposits 1,491,171 245,360 5,146,421 12,275 73,950,208
physical capital 48,311 6,121 219,100 0 5,061,705
equity capital 170,559 25,368 659,790 119 13,600,000
real estate loans 626,428 86,715 3,025,963 380 78,855,160
business loans 636,812 44,748 3,197,323 0 55,630,060
consumer loans 354,435 29,598 1,972,110 0 57,241,708
other loans 301,562 12,469 1,794,726 0 28,335,506
off-balance items 10,081 309 71,473 0 1,909,934
securities 564,284 94,297 2,109,004 5,281 37,701,704
1998 (n=1,502)
cost 60,738 5,341 331,560 441 5,251,706
revenue 56,319 5,552 283,537 321 4,703,494
labor 1,287 146 6,528 13 106,240
purchased funds 1,411,068 58,320 10,074,227 0 214,786,432
core deposits 2,195,308 282,254 10,366,007 0 171,007,584
physical capital 65,576 7,436 354,731 0 5,363,821
equity capital 395,330 37,544 2,093,045 766 33,722,732
real estate loans 1,180,320 153,139 5,603,618 0 94,699,016
business loans 757,000 38,333 4,619,897 0 78,369,608
consumer loans 483,723 26,100 3,050,176 0 65,750,176
other loans 293,276 8,247 2,006,102 0 36,980,268
off-balance items 23,568 433 157,420 5 2,814,678
securities 1,046,803 115,173 5,924,996 5,280 111,621,088
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Table 3.3 – continued
Variable Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max.
2005 (n=2,283)
cost 61,704 3,218 575,865 226 1.35e+07
revenue 54,854 3,899 468,871 59 9,283,821
labor 1,446 111 13,300 12 315,935
purchased funds 2,617,033 79,003 27,082,735 1,197 642,884,928
core deposits 2,539,293 231,704 21,730,681 6,916 520,162,240
physical capital 62,236 6,766 465,942 73 9,504,360
equity capital 647,755 30,993 6,056,327 5,311 120,564,552
real estate loans 2,010,958 177,296 15,962,526 0 311,206,912
business loans 679,075 33,712 6,187,991 0 118,629,544
consumer loans 679,542 11,022 8,134,545 0 179,799,616
other loans 324,438 5,874 3,141,593 0 70,143,480
off-balance items 42,129 375 446,441 2 11,264,050
securities 1,791,119 79,425 17,900,000 0 414,107,904
2010 (n=958)
cost 102,795 6,847 796,225 955 1.47e+07
revenue 98,870 8,343 808,663 709 1.42e+07
labor 2,370 228 17,856 29 289,070
purchased funds 6,365,284 222,182 58,130,366 0 980,933,568
core deposits 5,156,111 539,747 38,588,162 42,409 751,416,384
physical capital 118,694 16,482 735,249 157 13,839,608
equity capital 1,386,006 74,927 10,816,192 256 211,541,744
real estate loans 3,456,057 446,150 26,030,615 0 486,080,640
business loans 1,083,046 75,148 8,113,177 40 150,175,008
consumer loans 1,325,661 16,179 13,628,897 0 253,857,904
other loans 621,339 14,930 5,193,127 0 87,309,480
off-balance items 103,376 1,135 896,824 5 14,621,803
securities 4,304,046 170,793 36,797,850 548 636,865,472
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Table 3.4: Number of BHCs in the Sample
1988 1998 2005 2010












Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 1.031 1.062 1.074 -
48 29 17 1
Q2 1.001 0.988 1.005 0.928
21 41 93 18
Q3 0.840 1.088 1.003 1.115
3 7 76 68
Q4 1.803 2.588 1.577 0.848




Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 1.054 1.113 1.011 1.068
23 39 34 12
Q2 0.959 0.981 0.927 0.867
3 16 45 63
Q3 - - 1.005 0.818
0 0 13 90
Q4 - - - 0.550




Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 1.035 0.980 1.121 2.144
11 11 9 2
Q2 0.883 0.965 1.059 0.888
17 18 32 16
Q3 1.011 1.215 0.965 0.870
3 6 36 32
Q4 - - 1.096 0.677
0 0 1 70
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Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 0.976 0.962 0.946 0.792
42 144 84 6
Q2 1.139 0.945 0.919 0.898
2 53 172 41
Q3 - 1.273 0.961 0.879
0 2 73 185
Q4 - - - 0.726




Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 0.959 1.011 0.917 0.877
43 21 16 2
Q2 0.916 1.011 0.954 0.881
61 61 30 7
Q3 0.976 1.025 1.028 0.892
15 44 107 36
Q4 - 1.231 1.100 0.852




Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 0.825 0.812 - -
13 2 0 0
Q2 0.958 1.142 1.161 -
56 14 6 0
Q3 1.015 1.092 1.059 0.996
141 166 64 2
Q4 0.565 1.207 1.130 1.168
2 25 149 210
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Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 1.233 1.141 1.096 1.230
48 29 17 1
Q2 1.045 1.040 1.032 1.027
21 41 93 18
Q3 1.077 1.031 1.037 1.071
3 7 76 68
Q4 0.821 1.117 1.063 1.087




Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 1.269 1.249 1.191 1.156
23 39 34 12
Q2 1.107 1.166 1.137 1.120
3 16 45 63
Q3 - - 1.120 1.204
0 0 13 90
Q4 - - - 1.449




Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 1.643 1.611 1.483 1.555
11 11 9 2
Q2 1.358 1.256 1.274 1.285
17 18 32 16
Q3 1.170 1.088 1.189 1.151
3 6 36 32
Q4 - - 1.235 1.187
0 0 1 70
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Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 1.096 1.109 1.076 1.018
42 144 84 6
Q2 0.974 1.118 1.094 1.056
2 53 172 41
Q3 - 1.051 1.094 1.111
0 2 73 185
Q4 - - - 1.288




Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 1.343 1.202 1.242 1.150
43 21 16 2
Q2 1.245 1.136 1.113 1.111
61 61 30 7
Q3 1.076 1.057 1.063 1.049
15 44 107 36
Q4 - 0.904 1.098 1.082




Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 1.420 1.074 - -
13 2 0 0
Q2 1.137 1.087 1.074 -
56 14 6 0
Q3 1.029 0.953 0.946 0.938
141 166 64 2
Q4 1.000 0.929 0.916 0.844
2 25 149 210
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Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 1.023 1.003 0.974 5.457
48 29 17 1
Q2 0.977 0.961 0.944 0.865
21 41 93 18
Q3 0.992 1.063 0.982 0.908
3 7 76 68
Q4 1.571 1.072 1.101 0.862




Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 1.018 1.051 0.971 1.057
23 39 34 12
Q2 0.959 0.947 0.909 0.846
3 16 45 63
Q3 - - 0.985 0.837
0 0 13 90
Q4 - - - 0.565




Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 1.020 0.972 1.088 2.547
11 11 9 2
Q2 0.957 1.004 0.991 0.962
17 18 32 16
Q3 1.016 1.138 0.989 0.901
3 6 36 32
Q4 - - 1.211 0.709
0 0 1 70
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Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 0.954 0.956 0.936 0.881
42 144 84 6
Q2 0.937 0.953 0.949 0.914
2 53 172 41
Q3 - 1.435 0.947 0.913
0 2 73 185
Q4 - - - 0.721




Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 1.021 1.009 1.004 0.966
43 21 16 2
Q2 1.074 1.041 0.986 1.011
61 61 30 7
Q3 1.120 1.036 1.050 0.949
15 44 107 36
Q4 - 1.326 1.065 0.887




Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 0.848 1.390 - -
13 2 0 0
Q2 1.045 1.001 1.151 -
56 14 6 0
Q3 1.098 1.099 1.0828 1.180
141 166 64 2
Q4 1.024 1.198 1.139 1.182
2 25 149 210
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Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 0.929 0.915 0891 0.983
48 29 17 1
Q2 0.912 0.924 0.916 0.902
21 41 93 18
Q3 0.906 0.883 0.915 0.947
3 7 76 68
Q4 0.775 1.133 0.915 0.938




Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 0.719 0.758 0.753 0.742
23 39 34 12
Q2 0.777 0.803 0.811 0.807
3 16 45 63
Q3 - - 0.798 0.870
0 0 13 90
Q4 - - - 1.067




Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 0.817 0.812 0.757 0.762
11 11 9 2
Q2 0.739 0.723 0.719 0.685
17 18 32 16
Q3 0.724 0.683 0.720 0.734
3 6 36 32
Q4 - - 0.803 0.781
0 0 1 70
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Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 0.852 0.872 0.869 0.828
42 144 84 6
Q2 0.809 0.888 0.877 0.856
2 53 172 41
Q3 - 0.827 0.896 0.905
0 2 73 185
Q4 - - - 1.079




Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 0.844 0.801 0.802 0.766
43 21 16 2
Q2 0.815 0.772 0.761 0.777
61 61 30 7
Q3 0.762 0.764 0.766 0.776
15 44 107 36
Q4 - 0.713 0.794 0.820




Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 1.208 1.042 - -
13 2 0 0
Q2 0.956 0.920 0.926 -
56 14 6 0
Q3 0.895 0.862 0.859 0.842
141 166 64 2
Q4 0.882 0.858 0.848 0.773
2 25 149 210
103




Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 0.956 1.066 1.083 1.981
48 29 17 1
Q2 1.003 1.077 1.058 1.011
21 41 93 18
Q3 0.772 1.038 1.012 1.011
3 7 76 68
Q4 1.085 2.396 1.514 0.906




Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 1.042 1.137 1.059 1.057
23 39 34 12
Q2 1.022 1.070 1.061 0.996
3 16 45 63
Q3 - - 1.036 0.968
0 0 13 90
Q4 - - - - 0.744




Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 0.878 1.085 1.139 1.411
11 11 9 2
Q2 0.897 1.032 1.088 0.870
17 18 32 16
Q3 0.965 1.081 1.119 0.993
3 6 36 32
Q4 - - 1.090 0.844
0 0 1 70
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Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 1.149 1.115 1.062 0.911
42 144 84 6
Q2 1.011 1.033 1.005 0.940
2 53 172 41
Q3 - 1.204 1.016 0.960
0 2 73 185
Q4 - - - 0.856




Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 0.947 1.082 1.038 0.835
43 21 16 2
Q2 0.889 1.009 0.983 0.863
61 61 30 7
Q3 0.903 1.019 1.021 0.976
15 44 107 36
Q4 - 1.143 1.109 0.921




Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 0.715 0.769 - -
13 2 0 0
Q2 0.878 1.040 1.003 -
56 14 6 0
Q3 0.894 1.002 1.021 0.700
141 166 64 2
Q4 0.473 1.062 1.023 1.087
2 25 149 210
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Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 1.474 1.306 1.260 2.115
48 29 17 1
Q2 1.100 1.040 1.042 1.053
21 41 93 18
Q3 1.181 1.059 1.045 1.063
3 7 76 68
Q4 1.031 1.068 1.065 1.070




Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 1.543 1.430 1.420 1.406
23 39 34 12
Q2 1.164 1.197 1.207 1.210
3 16 45 63
Q3 - - 1.245 1.249
0 0 13 90
Q4 - - - - 1.423




Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 2.337 1.979 1.847 2.743
11 11 9 2
Q2 1.736 1.500 1.523 1.547
17 18 32 16
Q3 1.498 1.306 1.363 1.290
3 6 36 32
Q4 - - 1.316 1.272
0 0 1 70
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Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 0.998 1.112 1.121 1.113
42 144 84 6
Q2 1.042 1.152 1.169 1.155
2 53 172 41
Q3 - 1.150 1.172 1.162
0 2 73 185
Q4 - - - 1.302




Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 1.542 1.379 1.421 1.407
43 21 16 2
Q2 1.435 1.326 1.327 1.302
61 61 30 7
Q3 1.245 1.242 1.220 1.166
15 44 107 36
Q4 - 1.147 1.172 1.189




Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 1.646 1.289 - -
13 2 0 0
Q2 1.286 1.188 1.191 -
56 14 6 0
Q3 1.154 1.060 1.035 1.043
141 166 64 2
Q4 1.048 1.009 1.005 0.917







Most non-parametric regression methods suffer from the well-known curse of dimensionality,
a phenomenon that causes rates of convergence to become slower, and estimation error to increase
dramatically, as the number of continuous right-hand side variables increases (the presence of discrete
dummy variables does not affect the rate of convergence of our estimator). To help mitigate this
problem, we use a dimension-reduction technique based on principal components. The idea is to
trade a relatively small amount of information in the data for a reduction in dimensionality that
will have a large (and favorable) impact on estimation error.
Let J = 7 denote the sum of the number of continuous variables on the right-hand side of
Model j , excluding the ordered categorical variable T and the binary dummy variable D . For an (n
x 1) vector U define the function
ψ1(U) ≡ (U− n−1U′U)[n−1U′U− n−2U′ii′U]−1/2 (A.1)
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where i denotes an (n x 1) vector of 1s. The function ψ1(.) standardizes a variable by subtracting its
sample mean and then dividing by its sample standard deviation. Next, let A be an (n x J) matrix










Let Λ be the (J x J) matrix whose columns are the eigenvectors of the (J x J) correlation
matrix whose elements are the Pearson correlation coefficients for pairs of columns of A. Let λk be
the eigenvalue corresponding to the kth eigenvector in the kth column of Λ, where the columns of
Λ, and hence the corresponding eigenvalues, have been sorted so that λ1≥...≥λ5. Then set P=AΛ.
The matrix P has dimensions (n x J), and its columns are the principal components of A. Principal






represents the proportion of the independent linear information in A that is contained in
the first k principal components, i.e., the columns of P.
Using our data, we find φk = 0.5055, 0.7220, 0.8629, 0.9247, 0.9584, 0.9862, and 1.0 for k =
1, . . . , 7 respectively. Consequently, in our non-parametric estimation of the cost function in each
model, we use the first four principal components, omitting the last three. In doing so, we sacrifice
a relatively small amount of informationabout 7.5 percent of the independent linear information in
the samplein order to reduce the dimensionality of our estimation problem by three dimension in the
space of the continuous covariates. Given the curse of dimensionality, this seems a good trade-off.1
A.2 Estimating Returns to Scale
Let P.k denote the kth column of the principal component matrix P and define





1The convergence rate of our local linear estimator is n1/(4+l), where l is the number of continuous
right-hand side variables. With n = 135, 635 observations and l = 4 continuous right-hand side
variables, we achieve an order of estimation error that would require 594,180 observations with
five continuous right hand-side variables, 2,602,943 observations with six continuous right hand-side
variables, and 11,402,792 observations with six continuous right hand-side variables.
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The transformation ψ0(P.k) has (constant) unit variance. Next, let zi represent the row
vector containing the ith observations on ψ0(P.1), ψ0(P.2), ψ0(P.3), and ψ0(P.4). We can now write
our model as the following regression equation:
Ci = m(zi ,Ti ,Di1) + εi (A.4)
where the subscript i indexes observations, Ci = ψ1(log(
Ci
Wi3
)), and εi is a random error
term with E(εi) = 0 and VAR(εi) = σ
2(zi). The function m(zi ,Ti ,Di) = E(Ci—m(zi ,Ti ,Di) is
a conditional mean function, and can be estimated by non–parametric methods. Moreover, since
the transformation from (C/W3) to C can be inverted, given an estimated value m̂(z ,T ,D1 ),
straightforward algebra leads to an estimate
Ĉ (y, w) = exp[ψ−11 (m̂(z ,T ,D1 )]. (A.5)
To estimate returns to scale, we need merely estimate the measure S(θ | y0,w0) defined ear-
lier by replacing C(y0,w0) and C(θy0,w0) on the right-hand side of (2.4) with estimates Ĉ(y0,w0)
and Ĉ(θy0,w0) obtained from (A.5).
In order to estimate the conditional mean function in (A.4), suppose (for the moment)
that the time variable T and the binary dummy variables D1, D2 do not influence the value of the
conditional mean function m(zi ,Ti ,D1 ,D2 ), so that we can write the conditional mean function on
the right-hand side of (A.4) as m(z ). Both the Nadaraya-Watson (Nadaraya, 1964; Watson, 1964)
kernel estimator and the local linear estimator are special cases of local polynomial estimators;
with the local linear estimator, the local polynomial is of order 1, while with the Nadaraya-Watson
estimator the local polynomial is of order 0. The local linear estimator has less asymptotic bias, but
the same asymptotic variance, as the Nadaraya- Watson estimator.
To illustrate the local-linear estimator, momentarily ignore the discrete covariates in (A.4)
and write the conditional mean function as m∗(z ) in a neighborhood of an arbitrary point z0 :
m∗(z ) ≈ m∗(z0 ) +
∂m∗(z )
∂z
(z − z0 ) (A.6)
This suggests estimating the conditional mean function at z0 by solving the locally weighted
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[Ci − α0 − (zi − z0 )α]2K(|H|−1(zi − z0 )) (A.7)





= 1 and K (u) = K (−u), u ∈ Rl ; H is an l x l matrix of bandwidths; α0 is a scalar, and α is an
l -vector.
The solution to the least squares problem in (A.7) is
[α̂0 α̂]
′ = (Z′ΦZ)−1Z′ΦC, (A.8)
where C = [C1...Cn ]
′, Φ = diag [K(|H|−1(zi − z0 ))], and Z is an n x (l+1) matrix with ith
row given by [1 (zi − z0 )]. The fitted value α̂0 provides an estimate m̂∗(z0 ) of the conditional mean
function m∗(z0 ) at an arbitrary point z0 .
2
2The fitted values in α̂ provide estimates of elements of the vector ∂m(z0 )/∂z . However, if
the object is to estimate first derivatives, mean-square error of the estimates can be reduced by
locally fitting a quadratic rather than a linear expression (see Fan and Gijbels, 1996 for discussion);
this increases computational costs, which are already substantial for the local linear fit. Moreover,
determining the optimal bandwidths becomes more difficult and computationally more burdensome
for estimation of derivatives. See Hardle (1990, pp. 160–162) for discussion of some of the issues
that are involved with bandwidth selection for derivative estimation.
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